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Abstract 
When evaluating how to proceed against a corporate investigative 
target, law enforcement authorities often ignore the target’s governance 
arrangements, while subsequently negotiating or imposing governance 
requirements, especially in deferred prosecution agreements. Ignoring 
governance structures and processes amid investigation can be 
hazardous, and implementing improvised reforms afterwards may have 
severe unintended consequences—particularly when prescribing 
standardized governance devices. Drawing, in part, on new lessons from 
three prominent cases—Arthur Andersen, AIG, and Bristol-Myers 
Squibb—this Article criticizes prevailing discord and urges prosecutors 
to contemplate corporate governance at the outset and to articulate 
rationales for prescribed changes. Integrating the role of corporate 
governance into prosecutions would promote public confidence in 
prosecutorial decisions to broker firm-specific governance reforms 
currently lacking, and would increase their effectiveness. The Article, 
therefore, contributes a novel perspective on the controversial practice: 
though substantial commentary urges prosecutors to avoid intruding 
into corporate governance, this Article explains the importance of 
prosecutors investing in it.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Prosecutors in the boardroom” is a slogan that reflects an 
unintended early twenty-first century overlap of corporate governance 
and corporate criminal liability.1 Although exaggerated, the phrase 
reflects how prosecutors increasingly demand corporate governance 
                                                                                                                     
 1. It also inspired a book title. PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW 
TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). 
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reforms when using deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to settle 
criminal cases.2 While a growing body of scholarship seeks to put 
governance beyond the purview of prosecutors—ousting prosecutors 
from the boardroom3—this Article explains why prosecutors should 
carefully consider governance in determining how to proceed ex ante 
and articulate rationales for governance changes in DPAs ex post.  
Prosecutorial failure to consider governance ex ante can have 
adverse consequences, including activating governance mechanisms not 
designed for the purpose and forcing corporate actors to hastily adopt 
changes that they would ordinarily evaluate and debate dispassionately.4 
Subsequent prosecutorial prescriptions of governance changes are rarely 
the product of articulated rationales and can seem like ad hoc ransoms 
or trophies created on the fly by prosecutors seeking to claim victory. 
Irreconcilable criticisms result, with many observers saying that DPAs 
are coerced extractions of overzealous prosecutors while others say that 
DPAs are mere whitewash and let corporate crooks off the hook.5  
Prosecutors should publicly articulate ex post their rationales for 
proposed governance changes, and that articulation should be based on 
their assessment ex ante of the target’s governance profile. Creating 
such an ex ante profile would involve modest incremental costs while 
improving the quality of prosecutorial decisions on how to proceed with 
a case. The subsequent articulation of rationales would add substantial 
systemic benefits by increasing rationality, building credibility, 
deflecting criticism, and creating a catalogue of knowledge useful in 
future prosecution, regulation, and governance design. This Article thus 
parts with critics of prosecutors in the boardroom by explaining the 
value of prosecutorial investment in corporate governance.  
Part I of this Article first defines the concept of corporate 
governance. It then highlights the most important developments of the 
corporate governance movement of the past two generations and 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 887–89 
(2007); see also Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 60–61 (2006). 
 3. E.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting 
Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, 
supra note 1, at 63; see also Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 627–
39 (2012) (exploring reasons why ex post prosecution rather than ex ante regulation may occur 
and suggesting that the effects may leave society worse off).  
 4. See Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in 
Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 32–58 (2010); see also Samuel W. Buell, 
Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1623–24 (2007). 
 5. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 28, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116468395737834160.html, with Letter from 
Ralph Nader & Robert Weissman, to Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen. of the U.S. (June 5, 2006), 
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/editorsblog/?p=30 (discussing DPA with Boeing). The 
truth, undoubtedly, is somewhere in between.  
3
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distinguishes corporate governance features from compliance. While 
critics allow room for prosecutors to consider compliance in the 
exercise of their discretion, this preliminary discussion stresses the 
importance of addressing governance, not merely compliance. The well-
known story of the 2002 prosecution of the venerable accounting firm 
Arthur Andersen is invoked to illustrate the underappreciated 
importance of governance. Many take the lesson of Andersen’s 
destruction by indictment to warn against indicting large business 
organizations. Part I, in contrast, argues that Andersen’s seminal lesson 
is the prudence of prosecutorial consideration of governance when 
deciding how to proceed against a business.  
Part II presents an original account of a more obscure but richer 
story: the 2005 prosecutorial probe into American International Group 
(AIG). It explains how prosecutorial failure to evaluate AIG’s corporate 
governance realities in 2005 propelled AIG’s culpability at the center of 
the 2008 financial crisis. Analysis reveals concern that prosecutors fail 
to appreciate how formal uniformity in corporate governance regulation 
masks considerable substantive variation and how this failure can be 
costly.  
Part III explores the relationship between prosecutors and corporate 
governance, particularly the proper scope of DPAs. One approach, 
implicitly reflected in the status quo, conceives of DPAs as pure 
contracts whose terms are limited only by standard contract doctrine. 
Another approach, critical of current practice, conceives of DPAs as 
pure regulation whose terms are limited to those targeting compliance, 
and prohibits consideration of broader aspects of corporate governance. 
A third approach, the most apt, recognizes DPAs as products of 
prosecutorial discretion that are subject to prosecutorial restraint. In this 
view, DPAs warrant an integrated approach covering a wide range of 
terms—including governance terms—that are subject to prudential 
restrictions. Prosecutors should only proffer such terms when they have 
assembled a formal governance profile of a corporate target ex ante and 
should publicly explain the rationale for such terms when announcing 
DPAs ex post. Benefits and costs are hypothesized and assessed, 
lending support to the integrated approach.6 
Part IV offers examples of governance terms found in DPAs and 
discusses credible rationales that prosecutors might have articulated for 
them. Examples include terms from the DPA in the case of Bristol-
Myers Squibb, which drew sharp criticism. Prosecutors subsequently 
published a detailed explanation,7 illustrating the articulated rationale 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Costs are discussed infra pp. 57–58. 
 7. See generally Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of 
Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney 
for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1047–
4
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that this Article prescribes. Appendices excerpt governance terms of the 
Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA and related prosecutorial explanations, not 
so much to assert their optimality or ideality, but to suggest the 
feasibility of fulfilling this Article’s prescriptions at reasonably low cost 
with valuable payoffs.  
This Article concludes that the Department of Justice (DOJ) should 
lead by updating its guidelines for federal prosecutions of corporate 
targets to reflect the integrated approach, and that other prosecutors 
should follow the DOJ’s lead. The DOJ has been reluctant to publish 
guidance on corporate governance reforms in DPAs.8 But this Article 
urges steps that should be acceptable to prosecutors. The first is to add 
corporate governance as a factor to the existing list of factors 
prosecutors are told to consider when evaluating how to proceed with a 
case.9 The other, only slightly lengthier, would direct prosecutors to 
publicly articulate their reasoning for proffered governance reforms.  
Critics who seek to oust prosecutors from the boardroom see 
frequent and extensive incursions into corporate governance that must 
be repelled, while those who perceive excessive leniency are eager for 
greater prosecutorial inroads into governance. Under the integrated 
approach, the exact DPA population or density of governance terms 
becomes less important than whether there is an investigation ahead of 
time and an articulated rationale afterwards.  
I.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ARTHUR ANDERSEN 
Prosecutors must appreciate both the variety of corporate governance 
arrangements and the varying governance regimes across different 
forms of business organizations when deciding how to proceed in a 
criminal case against a business.10 Instead, prosecutors talk in sweeping 
                                                                                                                     
60 (2006) (discussing the 2005 DPA entered into by the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.). 
 8. Compare Deferred Prosecution: Should Corporate Settlement Agreements Be Without 
Guidelines?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 151–54 (Mar. 11, 2008) (written testimony of Brandon L. Garrett, 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law) (calling for DOJ to adopt 
clearer rules or guidance on corporate governance aspects of DPAs), with Letter from Brian A. 
Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Conyers, Jr., 
Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary (May 15, 2008) (on file with author). 
 9. See infra notes 79, 378 and accompanying text. 
 10. The popular press portrayed prosecutors as anemic in failing to charge individuals or 
firms with crimes arising out of the financial crisis of 2008. See, e.g., Editorial, No Crime, No 
Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/
no-crime-no-punishment.html. Prosecutors explained that abstinence was not for lack of power 
but for lack of evidence, with both the DOJ and the SEC noting that they had conducted an in-
depth, unhindered investigation into numerous firms, including Goldman Sachs. See, e.g., Halah 
Touryalai, Goldman Sachs: No Longer Enemy #1, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2012, 1:39 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/08/10/goldman-sachs-no-longer-enemy-numb 
5
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and vague terms about rehabilitation of corporate cultures—for 
example, from a “culture of corruption or criminality” to a “culture of 
compliance.”11 This Part defines corporate governance, highlights the 
achievements and shortcomings of the corporate governance movement 
of the past two generations, and distinguishes governance from 
compliance. It concludes by drawing a new lesson from an old story: the 
2002 federal indictment of Arthur Andersen does not necessarily teach 
that prosecutors should refrain from indicting large businesses because 
doing so presents adverse collateral consequences for innocent parties.12 
Rather, the seminal lesson is the importance of prosecutors weighing the 
significance of governance when making decisions about whether and 
how to charge organizations with crimes.  
A.  Definition and Variability 
Corporate governance is defined as “[t]he system of rules, 
practices[,] and processes by which a company is directed and 
controlled.”13 It is a broad term applicable to any business organization. 
It encompasses a company’s business purpose and the mechanisms used 
to achieve that business purpose.  
Firms have a variety of business purposes, and any given company 
may have multiple purposes. Common purposes for U.S. companies are 
to maximize stock price (if publicly traded) and net profits. Some 
companies, such as Ben & Jerry’s, seek to promote social objectives.14 
Others, such as Johnson & Johnson, seek to advance the interests of 
particular stakeholders in given orders, such as customers, employees, 
communities, and shareholders.15 Foreign companies have even more 
varied business purposes.16 
                                                                                                                     
er-one. 
 11. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS TAKE ON 
CORPORATIONS ch. 3 (forthcoming 2014) (draft manuscript on file with author and cited with 
permission); Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for 
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1431 (2009); Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office 
Dist. of N.J., Complaint Dismissed Against Wright Medical Technology, Inc. (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/Wright%20Medical%20Technology%20Inc.%20Com
plaint%20Dismissal.html (boasting of inducing the target company to “implement a compliant 
corporate culture”). 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 88–107. 
 13. Corporate Governance, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
corporategovernance.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).  
 14. See Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of 
Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1625, 1637–38, 1642–43 (1993). 
 15. Our Credo, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, http://www.jnj.com/sites/default/files/pdf/
jnj_ourcredo_english_us_8.5x11_cmyk.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
 16. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical 
Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1140–42 (1999). 
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Organizational arrangements bearing on the pursuit of business 
purposes address the board of directors, officers, employees, and 
owners.17 Terms concern board size, board procedures, director 
selection, director identity, officer functions, reporting protocols, 
leadership philosophies, employee training, and organizational policies 
and procedures. Features include shareholder demographics, such as the 
degree of ownership by institutional and individual investors as well as 
the firm’s directors, officers, and employees. Features also include the 
characteristics of any controlling shareholder and whether a company is 
publicly traded. 
Further delineation of an overall governance profile reaches matters 
of employee compensation and morale, as well as internal controls, 
including compliance with the law. A corporation’s regulatory 
environment can be important too, especially for firms in highly 
regulated industries where criminal prosecution—or even indictment—
can expose firms to debarment from government contracts or licenses. 
Within this framework, governance may encompass how professional 
advisors such as auditors and lawyers are recruited, supervised, and 
paid. Among a potpourri of other attributes of governance are topics 
such as charitable giving, political speech, and CEO succession. Finally, 
the subjects of financial reporting and disclosure are also critical aspects 
of corporate governance for publicly traded companies. 
Corporate governance, therefore, includes a wide variety of features 
that may be a product of norms, practices, history, culture, contract, 
bylaw, charter, regulation, or statute. Some features are definite, 
observable, and changeable by law or bargain, such as the type and 
number of directors and how employees are trained and paid. Others are 
more fluid, intangible, and persistent, such as the “tone” at the top, 
employee culture, and shareholder apathy or activism. Given such 
variety within companies, corporate governance changes have vastly 
different effects on each company.  
Although corporate governance literally denominates governance of 
the corporate form of business organization, the concepts and issues 
apply to other forms of business organization as well, including 
partnerships, limited liability companies, and others. Ownership, 
control, and related governance attributes in those other business forms 
vary further. For example, partnerships tend to involve a greater degree 
of participation in management among the partners, and partner capital 
investments consist of skills and reputation as well as money. 
Understanding what makes a given business organization function 
requires a rudimentary grasp of such governance attributes, including an 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 (1994). 
7
Cunningham: Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated App
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
8 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
appreciation that what works for one enterprise may not work for 
another. As important, developments in the broader field of business 
law in recent generations have emanated from the corporate form, 
especially those associated with the corporate governance movement.  
B.  Movement and Power Shifts 
During most of the twentieth century in America, boards of directors 
tended to be collegial bodies operating in an atmosphere of trust and 
informality.18 Largely due to historical and political accident, managers 
were strong, directors supportive, and shareholders, especially in 
publicly traded firms, weak.19 This structure was famously described in 
the 1930s by Adolph A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner C. Means as resulting in 
the separation of corporate ownership from corporate control.20 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, there emerged a corporate governance 
movement that, along with a burgeoning scholarly literature, forged 
change in the traditional model of corporate governance.21 The 
corporate governance movement contended that corporations should 
maximize shareholder value.22 
Demand for change arose due to a combination of social, business, 
and legal factors, including corporate scandals that alienated 
shareholders, and judicial and regulatory reformers eager for change.23 
For shareholder advocates, the original goal of this movement was to 
focus corporations on the purpose of maximizing shareholder value. In 
the legal literature, this objective was expressed in terms of reducing 
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership from control 
in publicly traded corporations.24 Other proponents stressed broader 
concerns about civic responsibility.25 
Institutional Investors. The most significant development in the 
modern history of corporate governance has been the rise in institutional 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 68–71 (1971). 
 19. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 4–6 (1996). 
 20. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 69 (1932). 
 21. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the 
Vagaries of Director independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2005) (“Since the beginning 
of the corporate governance movement in the mid-1970s, enhancing the independence of 
corporate directors and their function on the board has been at the center of corporate 
governance reform.”). 
 22. See id.  
 23. See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
34–36 (1976). 
 24. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 73–74 (1996). 
 25. E.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 74 (1991). 
8
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ownership of corporate stock.26 Historically, individuals owned a 
significant percentage of the equity of large U.S. corporations.27 Since 
the 1970s, however, institutional investors have come to own a steadily 
growing percentage of these companies.28 These institutional investors 
drove the corporate governance movement. 
With vast pools of capital and the associated votes in corporate 
director elections concentrated in fewer hands, these shareholders 
gained greater influence in corporate boardrooms. In particular, 
institutional investors were unaffected by the expense of collective 
action and the problem of rational apathy that limit the power of 
individual shareholders.29  
Active shareholders, such as the California Public Employees 
Retirement System (CalPERS), transformed many aspects of corporate 
governance. For example, in 1992 the federal proxy rules were amended 
to improve the ability of institutional investors to plan coordinated 
campaigns to advance their corporate governance agendas.30 Further 
manifestations include increased frequency and adoption of shareholder 
proposals addressed to governance rather than social issues and 
expanded shareholder access to the corporation’s own proxy statement 
for the election of directors (so-called proxy access).31 Active 
shareholders also campaigned for specific corporate governance 
devices, such as imposing age limits for directors holding executive 
sessions of the board attended solely by outsiders, and prohibiting the 
same person from serving as both board chairman and CEO.32 
Outside Directors. But the single greatest consequence of the rise of 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 995–96 
(2010). 
 27. Id.  
 28. See G.J. Previts, A Pie Chart View of U.S. Publicly Traded Corporate Equity 
Distribution: 1950–2011 (2012) (slide show presentation on file with the author); see also 
Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy 33–34 (Fordham Univ. 
School of Law Working Paper Series, 2012), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=2079607. 
 29. Directors began to pay more attention to shareholder “voice,” offering shareholders an 
alternative to the only traditional way to object to disappointed expectations, which was to 
“exit,” meaning to sell the stock (once called the Wall Street rule). Cf. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, 
EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4 
(1970) (noting the “voice” and “exit” options as two methods by which management will 
discover the corporation’s shortcomings). 
 30. See Jill A. Hornstein, Note, Proxy Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an 
Incremental Step Toward Effective Corporate Governance, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129, 1132–34 
(1993). 
 31. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1260–
61 (2009); Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 
435, 447 (2012); Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 1019. 
 32. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 1022–23. 
9
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institutional investors, and the other most significant achievement of the 
corporate governance movement, has been the consequent rise in the 
number and power of outside directors—those not otherwise employed 
by or associated with the corporation.33 Institutional investors saw 
outside directors as a mechanism for monitoring management and 
therefore reducing agency costs.34 Outside directors promised a unique 
ability to render independent judgments and promote shareholder 
value.35  
Reinforcing the institutional investor appetite for outside directors, 
laws and regulations also increased outsiders’ number and power. State 
corporation law in the 1980s encouraged boards to have outside 
directors, especially for tasks such as evaluating takeovers and other 
transactions posing conflicts of interest.36 In federal securities law, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200237 expanded the power of outside directors 
regarding the auditing function, including giving outside directors 
complete power over the company’s auditor.38 The Dodd-Frank Act of 
201039 created similar requirements concerning compensation 
committees.40 Due to institutional investor preferences for outside 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 873 (1991). The concepts of outside 
and inside directors are vernacular terms whose precise definitions vary with context but the 
distinction generally is between directors who are employees of a company (inside) and those 
who are not (outside). More particular distinctions attempt to define a notion of “independent” 
to denominate directors whose lack of employee or other corporate status enables them to 
exercise judgments free of conflict of interest. Specific and varying definitions of director 
independence appear in such authorities as the federal securities laws, state corporation laws, 
stock exchange rules, corporate and board committee charters, corporate contracts, and various 
law reform documents. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 78, 84–90 (2007). 
 34. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1281–82 (1991). 
 35. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1526 (2007). 
 36. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2013); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 
709–10 (Del. 1983) (finding that the lack of conflict disclosure by directors and failure to utilize 
independent directors in negotiating an arm’s length transaction was unlawful); Paramount 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147, 1154 (Del. 1989) (viewing the use of 
independent directors favorably in analyzing a management-sponsored alternative to hostile 
takeover); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1993) 
(highlighting the importance of independent directors in conflict of interest situations); MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–8.61 (2013). 
 37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2),(m)(3)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 39. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 40. Id. § 952; see also Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, 77 Fed. Reg. 
38,422 (June 27, 2012) (adopting SEC Rule 10C-1 that implements statutory directives 
10
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directors and support from regulators, today’s boards of the largest 
publicly traded corporations often have no more than one or two inside 
(management) directors.41 
Gatekeepers. The third most significant development of the 
corporate governance movement was the increased involvement of 
professional advisors, called gatekeepers, in corporate process. 
Gatekeepers—traditionally auditors and lawyers—are participants in 
corporate process who stake their reputation when vouching for the 
validity or integrity of corporate decision-making.42 In financial 
reporting, for instance, auditors attest to the truth and fairness of 
accounting results. In raising capital, lawyers conduct due diligence to 
assure the legality of the offering.43  
Though gatekeepers had been involved in these transactions 
throughout the prior century, the corporate governance movement 
amplified the importance of their role.44 In a recent trend, outside 
directors retain their own lawyers to represent them. Historically, 
outside directors had not hired their own lawyers, but Sarbanes–Oxley 
authorized audit committee members to do so.45 A specialty legal 
practice emerged: representing outside directors, especially advising on 
disagreements with chief executives.46  
                                                                                                                     
requiring independent compensation committee members for issuers).  
 41. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 
135–36 (2010). 
 42. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 61 & n.20 (1986). 
 43. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in 
Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW. 1421, 1432 (2002). 
 44. See Abraham J. Briloff, The Corporate Society: We Are In Pari Delicto, 1 J. CORP. L. 
457, 462–64 (1976) (discussing the moral and ethical failures of professionals leading to public 
fiascos); Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990). Evidence of 
the importance attached to the gatekeeping function is clear from the expanding list of 
professionals who can provide such a service, which today includes rating agencies, research 
analysts, D&O insurers, and investment banks. See CLAIRE A. HILL & BRETT H. MCDONNELL, 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 255–369 (2012) (including 
pieces about such gatekeepers by Lawrence A. Cunningham, Jill E. Fisch, Tamar Frankel, Sean 
J. Griffith, Richard W. Painter, Aline Darbellay, and Frank Partnoy).  
 45. Proposals to equip outside directors with power to retain independent advisors 
remained rare even after being ordained in 1992 by the American Law Institute. 1 AM. LAW. 
INST., supra note 17, § 3.04; see also James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of 
Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 
1090 (2003) (making the “modest proposal” that outside directors asked to approve interested 
transactions of other directors retain their own lawyer). 
 46. Among the earliest and most prominent examples of outside lawyers exerting power 
in the boardroom to oust a chief executive occurred when Ira Millstein, of Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges, played that role in the 1992 dismissal of General Motors CEO Robert Stempel. See 
John A. Byrne, The Guru of Good Governance, BUS. WK. (Apr. 27, 1997), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1997-04-27/the-guru-of-good-governance; Alison Leigh 
11
Cunningham: Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated App
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
12 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
Shortcomings. These corporate governance developments have 
several shortcomings. First, the rise of institutional investors and outside 
directors may not have reduced agency costs as much as promised. 
Institutional investors, after all, manage money for others, meaning they 
are agents as well for their investors, and those investors face the costs 
of having those agents manage their money. The rise in power of 
institutional investors may have reduced one set of agency costs while 
creating another set in its place. Debate has centered on contesting the 
net effects.47 Further, institutional investors vary in many features, 
including relative activism and goals. Most institutional investors stress 
shareholder value, but many engage in “socially responsible investing” 
that addresses varied objectives such as environmental protection or 
human rights.48 
Concerning outside directors, there is not much empirical evidence 
that their presence improves shareholder value or corporate 
performance.49 Some evidence suggests a board’s independence is less 
important than its active engagement.50 Other evidence suggests that 
certain kinds of outside directors improve the performance of certain 
functions, such as adherence to accounting requirements.51 But, clearly, 
there is a trade-off between the expertise of inside directors and the 
independence of outside directors.52  
Debate continues over the exact value of gatekeepers and ways to 
improve their effectiveness.53 An acute case concerns the new practice 
of outside directors retaining independent counsel to advise them, 
                                                                                                                     
Cowan, The High-Energy Board Room, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/
1992/10/28/business/the-high-energy-board-room.html (noting GM’s hiring of Ira Millstein). 
 47. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992) (listing arguments for both sides of the 
institutional investor agency cost debate). 
 48. See CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR INCREASING CORPORATE VALUE 87 (1997). 
 49. E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 922 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard 
Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 
27 J. CORP. L. 231, 248, 262 (2002); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of 
Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 7, 8 (2003). 
 50. See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and 
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1283, 1298–
99 (1998). 
 51. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of 
the Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 478 (2008). 
 52. Id. at 467; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 
460 (2008). 
 53. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 345–63 (2004) (discussing methods of improving the 
effectiveness of gatekeepers). 
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especially on disagreements with management. Some experts see this 
development as perilous, as it cleaves boards into factions, injects 
lawyers deeply into corporate deliberations, and compromises the 
independence of outside directors when lawyers advise them of their 
personal best interest instead of the corporation’s best interest.54 In 
some cases, however, outside directors have assumed considerable 
power and authority in corporate boardrooms and have been exposed to 
personal liability—most notably in the cases of Enron and WorldCom.55 
Studies and debate concerning corporate governance features 
correctly suggest that any governance reform, from adding outside 
directors to having the audit committee supervise outside auditors, 
could have differing effects from company to company.56 Such 
differences expose a final weakness about the corporate governance 
movement: it often advanced reforms for adoption generally that 
overlooked variation among companies.57 That has been especially 
problematic concerning governance devices adopted in the aftermath of 
corporate scandal.58  
Despite broad observable phenomena, such as the rise of institutional 
investors, outside directors, and gatekeepers, there remains considerable 
variation in relevant corporate governance attributes at particular 
companies. Thus, boards may be required by law, stock exchange rule, 
or shareholder mandate to produce governance guidelines, committee 
charters, or ethics codes. But the resulting products and effects are 
unlikely to be identical at different firms. Indeed, some governance 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent 
Directors: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come as a General Practice, 59 BUS. LAW. 1413, 
1417–18 (2004) (identifying situations where independent counsel is appropriate and noting the 
potential downsides of independent counsel); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. 
Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel, 
59 BUS. LAW. 1389, 1402–03 (2004) (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 157 n.54 (2003)) (offering tepid 
acceptance of the concept).  
 55. See infra text accompanying notes 74–80. 
 56. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 814 
(2001) (noting the “ideal board structure may be firm-specific, or in some cases, industry-
specific”); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 284–85 (1997). 
 57. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 984, 995–96 (1993) (discussing the failure of certain firm theories based on lack of 
consideration for the adaptive nature of corporate governance).  
 58. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 89 (2003) (explaining that 
legislation following a crash can harm executive officers and firms that are risk-seeking rather 
than risk-averse); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587–90 (2005) (noting that Sarbanes–Oxley 
created differing burdens on smaller firms compared with larger firms). This literature addresses 
generally applicable laws and regulations adopted in response to financial crises, not the 
individualized setting of DPAs, which differs, as noted infra Subsection III.B.2. 
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regulations explicitly recognize that one size does not fit all, as when 
certain devices are required only of large companies and waived for 
smaller ones.59 
LLCs and LLPs. Finally, it should be noted that alternative forms of 
business organization have proliferated in the past two generations. The 
limited liability partnership and the limited liability company are the 
most prominent examples. They originate from the limited partnership 
and the corporation, respectively, and are defined by the high degree to 
which investors in them may enjoy the benefits of limited liability along 
with other advantages. At one time, entrepreneurs had to accept trade-
offs among alternative forms of business organization, such as between 
the limited shareholder liability of the corporate form that was subject to 
two levels of taxation or the single taxation of the partnership that 
exposed partners to unlimited liability. Thanks to statutory and 
contractual innovations that combine the appealing attributes of 
historical forms of business organization into modern hybrids, these 
alternative forms have developed to eliminate such trade-offs.60 
Governance features in these new forms of business organization are 
extensively tailored by contract and, therefore, are even more variable 
than the traditional partnership or corporation.  
C.  Compliance and the Rise of DPAs 
The subject of compliance is a narrow component of corporate 
governance. Its roots are anchored not so much in the corporate 
governance movement but in the concurrent intensification of 
organizational criminal liability. Although corporate-level criminal 
liability was recognized in a famous 1909 case,61 organizational 
criminal liability remained relatively rare throughout most of the 
twentieth century. During the 1970s, however, an eruption of corporate 
scandals inspired law enforcement authorities to strengthen their 
policing of corporate behavior.62 The Watergate-induced disclosures of 
corporate wrongdoing around the world by U.S. companies prompted 
legislation cracking down on such practices.63 Congress strengthened 
                                                                                                                     
 59. E.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 989G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1948 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) 
(relieving internal control audit obligations for certain smaller public companies); Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (to be codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A)) (creating a securities registration exemption for companies below a 
certain threshold). 
 60. E.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 137 (2010). 
 61. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 499 (1909). 
 62.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 & n.3 (1981). 
 63.  See Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM L. REV. 683, 683 
(2003). 
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criminal penalties under federal law across many fields, from antitrust 
to environmental to securities. Prosecutions ensued against corporations 
with household names, such as Drexel Burnham Lambert in finance and 
Exxon for the Exxon Valdez oil spill.64  
Compliance. The general approach of corporate-level criminal 
liability held corporations vicariously liable for acts of their agents 
taken within the scope of employment.65 Policing corporate wrongdoing 
through criminal law assumed a more formal dimension with the 
formation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1987 and the 
Commission’s production of the Federal Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines.66 These guidelines codified an approach to deterring 
corporate crime through a calibrated sentencing format. It gave 
corporations credit in sentencing for having effective compliance 
programs in place and for cooperating with lawmakers during 
investigations and resulting prosecutions. This amounted to a slight shift 
from the traditional standard of vicarious liability to a modified duty-
based approach to liability.67 That is, corporate exposure came to hinge 
on the relative effectiveness of a corporation’s compliance program.68 
The importance of effective compliance programs became more 
central to corporate life after 1996 when the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in Caremark announced clear compliance duties of corporate 
directors.69 Drawing in part on the Federal Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, Caremark questioned the continuing soundness of a 1963 
Delaware Supreme Court opinion that limited any such duties to cases 
in which red flags would have stimulated a reasonable director’s 
attention.70 Caremark stated that corporate directors must take 
reasonable efforts to assure that the company maintains effective 
compliance programs, a stance later validated by the Delaware Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 64. See DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND 
HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 69 (1995). 
 65. More sweeping variations were formulated as well. E.g., United States v. Bank of 
New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987) (describing the collective knowledge standard 
as an attribution of the sum total of employee knowledge across a corporation). 
 66. See Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their 
Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 207–09 (1993) (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act’s 
creation, underlying principals, and future development). 
 67. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate 
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) 
(comparing and analyzing vicarious liability and various forms of duty-based liability). 
 68. See id. at 697. 
 69. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 70. Id. at 969 (questioning Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 131 (Del. 
1963), which held that, in the absence of a reason to suspect antitrust violations, directors are 
not liable for failure to prevent antitrust activities by employees). 
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Court.71  
Caremark’s holding was narrow and arose in the settlement of a 
derivative suit that required the court to assess only whether a 
settlement was fair. But it spawned extensive commentary and 
expanded work for consultants as companies scrutinized internal 
compliance programs.72 Scholars, meanwhile, questioned whether the 
preoccupation with compliance would produce cosmetic exercises in 
window dressing rather than substantive control over internal corporate 
agents.73 After all, compliance systems and governance structures are 
rarely effective unless both senior management and individuals 
responsible for maintaining the structures believe in and endorse them. 
Employees and other constituents pick up on signals about whether 
management holds such commitments or is merely going through the 
motions. 
Enforcement Intensity and Andersen. The era of Enron and 
Sarbanes–Oxley brought renewed intensity to corporate criminal law, 
just as it did to corporate governance.74 Sarbanes–Oxley, enacted in 
2002, defined new crimes for wrongful financial statement 
certification,75 enhanced penalties for other business crimes,76 and 
directed the Sentencing Commission to design optimal approaches to 
corporate criminal liability.77 President George W. Bush formed the 
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force within the DOJ to fortify this 
area of law enforcement.78 The government’s rationale was outlined in a 
series of DOJ memos that focused on “getting tough” on corporate 
malfeasance, one of which stressed “vigorous enforcement” of law 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 967; Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 72. See generally H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight 
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2001) (discussing the 
implications of the Caremark decision); Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re 
Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 701–02 
(2004). 
 73. E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight 
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 314 (2004); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic 
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 513–14 (2003). 
 74. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes–Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 917 (2003). 
 75. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777–78 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). 
 76. Id. §§ 801–906 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).  
 77. Id. § 1104 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994).  
 78. See The President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). President Barack Obama 
expanded the program under a new name, the Interagency Financial Fraud Task Force. See 
President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCHANGE COMM’N (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-249.htm.  
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against “corporate wrongdoers.”79 The focus remained on corporate 
compliance programs as the key to optimal deterrence, with a new 
emphasis on mandatory cooperation that intensified the internal policing 
of corporate employees.80 
In response, prosecutors escalated high-profile suits against esteemed 
corporate directors and prominent auditing firms. A symbol of the 
seismic shift in enforcement occurred when twenty-two directors of 
Enron and WorldCom paid $39.25 million out of their own pockets, 
unreimbursed by insurance or the corporation, to settle suits against 
them.81 Whether desirable or not, directors across corporate America 
began to fear for their personal liability.  
A stunning result of the Enron-era enforcement intensification 
occurred in 2002 when the DOJ filed criminal charges for obstruction of 
justice against the venerable independent accounting firm Arthur 
Andersen, whose Houston office had signed off on Enron’s books.82 
During the government’s investigation of Enron, two senior Andersen 
employees destroyed drafts of documents related to the work.83 For that, 
the government indicted the entire firm, which at that time employed 
85,000 people84 and earned billions annually.85 The government won a 
fine of only $500,000.86 Settlement negotiations between prosecutors 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Successive Deputy Attorneys General of the United States signed the memos, the first 
of which was issued in 1999. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/
reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060201083908/http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/business_organiza
tions.pdf (archived at the Internet Archive); Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum from Mark Filip, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf.  
 80. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 
953–54, 1007–08 (2009). 
 81. See Bernard Black, Brian Chefffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2006).  
 82.  Indictment at 7, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, CRH-02-121 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 
7, 2002). 
 83. Id. at 7–8.  
 84. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 917, 935 
(2003).  
 85. Jonathan D. Glater, Audit Firms Await Fallout and Windfall, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/14/business/audit-firms-await-fallout-and-windfall.html. 
 86. Arthur Andersen Is Fined $500,000, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2002), 
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and the firm to avoid that result failed when the two could not agree on 
the firm’s admission of wrongdoing.87 Though a unanimous U.S. 
Supreme Court eventually overturned the firm’s later conviction,88 by 
then the prosecutorial enthusiasm had destroyed the firm.  
Proliferation of DPAs and Controversy. After Andersen, prosecutors 
became reluctant to indict entire companies that employed large 
numbers of innocent people, though they continued to hold that threat 
over the heads of top corporate officials.89 Such reluctance led to the 
proliferation of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), in which 
companies opt for cooperative settlement to avoid the fate that befell 
firms like Andersen. In DPAs, prosecutors agree with target 
corporations to defer or refrain from prosecution in exchange for the 
target admitting allegations, paying fines, and committing to various 
undertakings.90 Corporate undertakings include reforms such as detailed 
public disclosure of the matter, enhanced internal compliance programs, 
and top-level governance changes. If the government determines that 
the target breached, however, it can prosecute. At such a time, given the 
admissions, conviction is nearly certain.91 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/business/arthur-andersen-is-fined-500000.html.  
 87. The sticking point was important because the exact admission would influence the 
SEC’s decision about debarring the firm from auditing public companies—its bread and 
butter—a concern over civil consequences of the criminal procedure. See Brickey, supra note 
84, at 921. 
 88. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).  
 89. See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur 
Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 109–10 (2006); Andrew Weissman & David 
Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 442 & n.107 (2007). See 
generally James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 509 (2006) (discussing the negative consequences of indicting entire corporations 
at the expense of thousands of innocent employees). 
 90. Technically, prosecutors distinguish between deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) 
and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), but the distinction is immaterial to the questions 
addressed here concerning the legitimacy of including corporate governance terms in any such 
agreements. See First, supra note 4, at 45–46. NPAs are typically used in cases where no 
criminal charges are filed, while DPAs are reached to settle filed charges. Court approval is 
involved in the latter but not the former case, though little or no judicial second-guessing occurs. 
See infra text accompanying notes 266–276. 
 91. DPAs can resemble structural reform litigation developed through consent decrees in 
the civil rights area and resemble contemporary regulatory agency settlements. See Garrett, 
supra note 2, at 869–74 (noting parallels to and differences from structural reform litigation 
evaluated in the landmark work, Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976)). DPAs invert the consent decree model, however, as they target 
private rather than public actors and enforce criminal law not civil rights. Administrative 
settlements, apart from the civil/criminal distinction (and related risks of collateral 
consequences), more often than DPAs do not require admissions of facts or guilt and do not 
routinely entail commitments to reform compliance and governance. Agencies also bring the 
expertise of specialists in the substantive field to their task—such as environmental or health 
care—while prosecutors tend to be generalists. On the other hand, federal prosecutors, at least, 
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/1
2014] DEFERRED PROSECUTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19 
 
DPAs are age-old devices, but have become popular in the U.S. only 
in the past decade. Less than two dozen DPAs were ever used before 
2003, but nearly 300 have been signed since.92 During the summer of 
2012 alone, federal prosecutors entered into over a dozen DPAs with 
various corporate targets.93 In late 2012, the United Kingdom opted to 
follow this American development.94 Other countries are doing so as 
well.95 Nevertheless, while DPAs may be popular among prosecutors 
and some corporations, they are controversial among scholars and 
policymakers.96  
Critics detect prosecutorial overreaching in certain cases.97 They say 
prosecutors impose terms on corporations rather than enter into good 
                                                                                                                     
increasingly coordinate cases with expert administrative colleagues. Coordination sometimes 
results in compliance and governance reforms appearing in the civil settlement rather than the 
DPA. Such reforms draw on agency guidelines in the relevant regulatory field—yet another 
difference with the more ad hoc quality that seems to characterize the DPA population. Even so, 
the analysis in this Article is intended to provide a useful general framework for DPAs pursued 
by all prosecutors, especially criminal (federal, state, and local) but civil as well—possibly 
because of the emphasis on context throughout. See infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 92. A database of federal corporate DPAs is maintained at the University of Virginia, 
organized by Professor Brandon Garrett and Jon Ashley. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, 
Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, U. VA. SCH. L. http://lib.law.virginia.edu/
Garrett/prosecution_agreements/home.suphp (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). 
 93. Id. DPAs are also increasingly used to settle cases against individuals. One example 
includes the CEO of Monster Worldwide, who resolved a case against him using a DPA 
primarily because of unusual medical conditions he faced. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 
United States v. McKelvey, No. 08 Mag 0137 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2008), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/mckelvey_deferred_prosecution_
agreement.pdf. Another example is Floyd Landis, an Olympic cycling star accused of doping, 
who created a legal defense fund that turned out to be based on misleading statements. Former 
Pro Cyclist Floyd Landis Admits Defrauding Donors and Agrees to Pay Hundreds of Thousands 
of Dollars in Restitution, FBI (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/sandiego/press-releases/
2012/former-pro-cyclist-floyd-landis-admits-defrauding-donors-and-agrees-to-pay-hundreds-of-
thousands-of-dollars-in-restitution. 
 94. See Samuel Rubenfeld, U.K. to Move Forward with Deferred-Prosecution 
Agreements, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/10/23/uk-to-move-forward-with-deferred-prosecution-agreements/. 
 95. See Global Compliance Panel: Insights of Four Former Prosecutors, METRO. CORP. 
COUNS. (Sept. 2012), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2012/September/29.pdf. 
 96. See Joseph Warin, Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 26, 2012, 9:10 AM), 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/26/update-on-corporate-deferred-prosec  
ution-and-non-prosecution-agreements/ (“More often than not, the narrative surrounding 
DPAs . . . is negative . . . .”). 
 97. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the “New Regulators”: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2008); Miriam Hechler 
Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1044–72 (2008) (discussing how 
“[b]usinesses [o]verpay for [c]orporate [c]rime”); Arlen, supra note 3, at 62–86; PROSECUTORS 
IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 177, 177–85 
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). 
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faith negotiations that result in a voluntary or more tailored agreement.98 
Critics infer this from the inclusion of peculiar terms, such as requiring 
donations to be made to causes with which a prosecutor may have a 
connection.99 Other critics stress that there is simply no objective basis 
for determining the net cost and benefit of DPAs or whether they are 
effective.100 A broader critique questions the competence of prosecutors 
to propose or negotiate certain terms commonly used in DPAs, which 
extend from enhanced internal corporate procedures concerning 
compliance to personnel changes and other top-level governance 
mandates.101 
Several rationales, however, support DPAs. Rationales include 
avoiding the risk of adverse collateral consequences of corporate 
convictions—the so-called Andersen effect. From the perspective of 
economic theory, the adverse collateral consequences are essentially 
negative externalities, and DPAs are designed to avoid those. On the 
upside, DPAs are designed to achieve positive externalities, which arise 
from their production of general deterrence. DPAs may be valuable 
alternatives to criminal convictions or civil regulation when 
investigations generate firm-specific information about corporate 
defects that the agreements can cure. Finally, both sides may find a 
DPA appealing simply to avoid the cost and uncertainty of a trial.102 
D.  Andersen’s Seminal Lesson 
A new line of criticism is emerging to challenge the lessons that 
have been taken from the Andersen case. The extensive literature 
routinely repeats that the lesson of Andersen is that prosecutors should 
try earnestly to avoid indicting large business organizations because of 
the risk of the collateral consequences for innocent people.103 
Prosecutors embraced the point, as the frequency of prosecution, 
especially of large business organizations, declined.104 This Andersen 
                                                                                                                     
 98.  Spivack & Raman, supra note 97, at 173. 
 99. Such criticisms can seem overstated. See discussion infra Section IV.B.  
 100. Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate 
Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 89, 119 (2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: 
DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 25–28 (2009). Legislators have taken 
heed, with bills in Congress proposing standards to govern DPAs and promote prosecutorial 
accountability. E.g., H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. (2009) (“To regulate certain deferred prosecution 
agreements and nonprosecution agreements in Federal criminal cases.”). 
 101. See Arlen, supra note 3, at 64–68. See infra Section III.C for an evaluation of such 
objections and others. 
 102. See infra Subsection III.B.3 for additional references to possible rationales for DPAs. 
 103. See sources cited supra note 89. 
 104. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 
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effect, however, is not necessarily a valid lesson of Andersen, nor is it 
the most important lesson.  
On the contrary, empirical evidence accumulated since Andersen 
demonstrates that corporations and other businesses rarely collapse 
from indictments or face other serious collateral consequences. For 
example, recent research identified several dozen indictments of large 
public corporations in the past decade; only a handful of the firms failed 
and the indictment was not necessarily the cause.105 Even iconic firms 
such as Steve Madden’s shoe company and Martha Stewart’s lifestyles 
business survived criminal convictions of those people.106 As a matter 
of theory, moreover, there is reason to doubt whether such collateral 
risks are a sufficient justification for DPAs as opposed to indictment 
and prosecution.107  
Underappreciated Governance. A more important lesson of 
Andersen is how prosecutors may have given inadequate attention to the 
firm’s governance. Andersen’s salient governance features were those 
associated with its form, ownership, and management. Andersen was a 
partnership. Its members owned the firm and managed it. Many 
members had considerable human and financial capital tied to the 
firm.108 Threats to the firm’s survival from an indictment could be 
expected to induce partner withdrawals, including flights to peer firms, 
                                                                                                                     
1794 (2011).  
 105. See Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: 
Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 837–39 
(identifying fifty-one companies, though a review of the list suggests the need to add and 
subtract a few, in part to verify which were public at the time of prosecution and conviction and 
in part to address the exact posture of the case in terms of criminal procedure). The companies 
that reportedly failed were Utilicorp United, Winn Dixie Stores, Energy Partners, Ltd., Elpida 
Memory, and Japan Airlines International—and two of those failed businesses were 
nevertheless later taken over and rehabilitated to some extent by other companies. Id. at 823, 
840–42. Among companies indicted without subsequent failure were several global airlines (for 
antitrust violations); Chiquita Brands (for terrorist financing violations); and Eli Lilly (for 
selling misbranded drugs). Id. at 826, 833, 837–42. 
 106. See Laura M. Holson, Steve Madden Is Back, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/fashion/steve-madden-is-back.html (noting the company’s 
success); Martha Stewart Profit Helped by TV Show, Ads, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2006), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/23/business/fi-earns23.3 (reporting the company’s rising 
profits).  
 107. See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through 
Non-Prosecution 22–25 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author and cited with 
permission), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-
economics-studies/Arlen,%20J%20-%202012%20Fall%20WS.pdf (explaining how the concept 
of asset insufficiency in the economic theory of regulation cannot justify DPAs containing ex 
post regulatory terms).  
 108.  See Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, 
Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1170–72 
(2003). 
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and fuel a self-fulfilling spiral.109  
In contrast, had Andersen been a corporation, owned by diversified 
outside shareholders and managed by professional directors and 
officers, a different prediction would have been warranted. Such groups 
would have been less dependent on the firm than the partners were and 
thus better able and willing to bear the risk of staying the course. 
Despite the salient features of Andersen’s governance—a partnership 
owned and managed by its members—the warnings of an Andersen 
effect that stoked prosecutorial allergies to organizational indictments 
spoke of the danger indictments pose for large corporations.110 
As for clients, other aspects of Andersen’s governance, broadly 
defined, come into play. They might reasonably believe that an 
indictment could prompt federal regulators at the SEC to threaten to 
debar the firm’s authority to audit SEC registrants. Even private clients, 
not needing such SEC approval, valued Andersen as a partnership of 
professional accountants and its related reputation that the indictment 
threatened. An indictment of such a firm thus seems relatively likely to 
precipitate or accelerate defection by clients and partners alike. 
Collateral consequences, which ultimately destroyed the firm, were 
grave for the firm’s vast employee base that was largely innocent of 
wrongdoing. Also, clients were negatively impacted as they had to 
scramble to retain other auditors.111  
Governance Matters. The exact risks of indictment and probabilities 
of adverse collateral consequences cannot be gauged definitively. Yet 
the question of adverse collateral consequences—which DOJ guidelines 
since Andersen direct prosecutors to study112—requires an examination 
of governance features. That is the only way to determine whether the 
fallout from indictment will hurt innocent parties who warrant 
protection—and not every employee or shareholder group can claim 
such innocence. The DOJ’s solicitude for such groups is unusual within 
criminal law,113 which ordinarily offers little sympathy to the family and 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See Macey & Sale, supra note 108, at 1167–68.  
 110. See sources cited supra note 89. 
 111. To be sure, factors other than Andersen’s legal status as a partnership—and what 
prosecutors thought about that structure—played a role in the saga. Indeed, the firm’s 
disintegration began before prosecutors arrived on the scene. Moreover, a major problem was 
the lack of compromise between prosecutors and the firm. Prosecutors alleged that they had 
uncovered criminal obstruction: the firm refused to acknowledge any such thing. There was no 
middle ground. For an account of the case from the perspective of one of the prosecutors, see 
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 479–88 
(2006).  
 112. See sources cited supra note 79. 
 113. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 
1387–88 (2002). 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/1
2014] DEFERRED PROSECUTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 23 
 
associates of defendants.114 The DOJ cannot intend its collateral 
consequences principle to protect such groups unless they are deemed 
innocent, and assessing such a question ex ante requires considering the 
target’s governance. 
Among corporations, distinctions must be drawn between publicly 
held and closely held firms. These may imply different owner attitudes 
toward and managerial capacity for firm wrongdoing, probative of the 
degree to which collateral consequences of indictment or prosecution 
should be seen as adverse. The separation of ownership from control is 
starker in the case of a large public corporation, such as Archer Daniels 
Midland, where shareholders should be seen as relatively more worthy 
of protection than shareholders of an equally large nonpublic 
corporation, such as Cargill, where ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of a single family.115 Such differences warrant predicting 
different reactions to different forms of prosecutorial pressure and 
different perceptions of what constitutes adverse collateral 
consequences.  
Among publicly held corporations, distinctions and related 
predictions can be drawn on the basis of such potentially relevant 
factors such as the level and type of shareholder ownership and its 
bearing on questions of collective action and rational apathy. Collective 
action becomes easier as ownership is more concentrated in fewer hands 
and institutional ownership increases. Institutional investors should not 
always be seen as innocent victims but, given activism and power, they 
should be held accountable too.116  
Again, the type of institutional owner matters along with the size of 
holdings. Wal-Mart, for instance, is owned 48% by family-controlled 
Walton Enterprises,117 an ownership position that may entail 
responsibility for criminal conduct at the firm. A shareholder’s 
investment purpose may provide clear clues about relative culpability or 
innocence, with long-term investment outlooks potentially warranting 
greater respect than short-term arbitrage positions.118 Similarly, some 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See Susan Hoffman Fishman, The Impact of Incarceration on Children of Offenders, 
15 J. CHILD. CONTEMP. SOC’Y 89 (1982). 
 115.  See Brian Solomon, The Secret Cargill Billionaires and Their Family Tree, FORBES 
(Sept. 22, 2011, 12:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2011/09/22/the-
secretive-cargill-billionaires-and-their-family-tree. 
 116. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1295–96 (2008); Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the 
Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 438 & 
n.127 (2012); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, On the Sufficiency of Corporate Regulation as an 
Alternative to Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 117, 124 (2011). 
 117.  Andy Serwer, Are Wal-Mart Shares on Sale?, CNN MONEY (June 3, 2011, 5:00 AM), 
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/tag/walton-enterprises/. 
 118. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
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investors concentrate investment in a relatively smaller number of firms 
that enable close watch and disproportionate gains.119 Other investors, 
such as index funds, diversify greatly and should not be expected to 
provide similar monitoring, especially considering that they do not 
benefit as extensively from wrongdoing.120  
Among all corporations, those with higher degrees of insider 
ownership may respond differently and require different treatment than 
those with little or no such ownership. In corporations that have 
substantial employee ownership, as through employee stock ownership 
plans, the roles of employee and shareholder combine, so that any gains 
from criminal conduct that might accrue to shareholders are enjoyed by 
those participating employees.121 Shareholders who own substantial 
percentages of a corporation’s stock may indeed be victims when senior 
management commits crimes, but their ability to elect the board who 
appoints such officers negates the claim to innocent victimhood.122  
Besides such factors as type of business organization and 
shareholder demographics, prosecutors should consider additional 
governance details about targets. The most obvious details concern the 
special treatment required for businesses owned by other organizations, 
such as subsidiaries of corporate parents. Evaluating probable 
culpability and likely collateral consequences requires gauging the 
norms of governance in such settings and evaluating the degree to 
which they are followed.123  
Every governance situation differs somewhat. Prosecutors must 
therefore follow through with kindred profiles at target companies by 
specifically researching directors, officers, gatekeepers, employees, and 
controls. As a further illustration, Part II’s case study of AIG begins 
                                                                                                                     
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 363 (2012). 
 119. Examples: State Street Corp., which owns 12% of United Technologies; Berkshire 
Hathaway, which owns 8% of Wells Fargo; and Davis Selected Advisors, which owns 5% of 
CVS Caremark. (This and examples in the next few footnotes and accompanying text are drawn 
from a data set the author is compiling with assistance from Nicholas Stark, Reference 
Librarian, George Washington University Law School.) 
 120. The best example is Vanguard, an index investor barely audible among the activist 
investor crowd and owner of just under 5% of many of the largest American companies. Among 
the Fortune 50, Vanguard owns just under 5% of the voting stock of Exxon Mobil, Conoco 
Phillips, General Electric, AT&T, Bank of America, Verizon, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Procter & 
Gamble, Archer Daniels Midland, Boeing, and Pfizer. 
 121. Employee ownership levels vary among the largest U.S. corporations. Among the 
greatest percentage levels are Met Life (8%) and Ford Motor (7%).  
 122. To take some examples from among the Fortune 500 in the United States: Warren 
Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway (38%); Michael Dell of Dell (16%); Charles Schwab of Schwab 
(14%); Stephen Wynn of Wynn Resorts (10%); and Bill Gates of Microsoft (5.5%).  
 123. For a good discussion of the kinds of factors relevant in such a setting by non-experts 
demonstrating the possibility of mastering such terrain, see United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 
51, 71–72 (1998). 
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with a thumbnail sketch of its governance. Prosecutors would have done 
well to consider it when targeting AIG and settling using a DPA. Their 
failure to consider AIG’s governance proved disastrous. 
II.  AIG, OVERSIGHT, AND INATTENTION 
This Part, an original case study of AIG,124 first canvasses some of 
AIG’s distinctive governance features to illustrate the kind of profile 
useful for prosecutors to understand at the outset of investigation.125 It 
then explains how prosecutors’ ignorance or disrespect of those 
governance realities resulted in a hasty and costly upheaval that 
included ousting the company’s iconic CEO, Maurice R. “Hank” 
Greenberg. It shows how prosecutorial failure to investigate before 
intervening came at a high price as the subsequent discovery of only 
limited transgressions did not warrant the ouster decision, let alone an 
indictment. Finally, it shows the perils of conceiving of corporate 
governance as a uniform set of off-the-rack devices with no articulated 
rationale, as new governance at AIG led the company to the center of 
the 2008 financial crisis. The basis for two prescriptions emerges: 
prosecutors should strive to understand corporate governance when 
exercising discretion concerning prosecutions of business targets, and 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Much has been written about AIG’s role in the financial crisis of 2008, though much 
of that concentrates on the terms of related financial transactions rather than the governance 
history leading up to their creation. See, e.g., Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a 
World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2010). See generally William K. Sjostrom, 
Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009) (explaining the collapse of AIG, 
conditions accompanying the government bailout and why it was undertaken, and discussing 
whether it was necessary).  
 125. The AIG case study can seem aberrational, given the characters involved, peculiar 
features of New York law and politics, and the timing of events. But, in addition to remaining a 
bracing cautionary tale worth telling and mining for lessons, the potential for a replay should not 
be discounted. Similar controversy recurs about the exercise of prosecutorial authority and the 
independent streak of New York law enforcement authorities. One instance arose when New 
York’s Department of Financial Services, headed by Benjamin Lawsky, settled charges of 
terrorism-finance law violations against Standard Chartered, the British bank, while federal 
authorities pursued a parallel investigation. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, British Bank in $340 
Million Settlement for Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
08/15/business/standard-chartered-settles-with-new-york-for-340-million.html. Some stories 
drew explicit analogies between the two chief prosecutors involved (Eliot Spitzer in AIG and 
Benjamin Lawsky in Standard Chartered). See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Regulator Shines a 
Spotlight on a Bank, and on Himself, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/10/business/regulator-shines-spotlight-on-a-bank-and-on-himself.html. More generally, 
federal prosecutors’ offices vary from many state counterparts, such as those in New York, 
where the attorney general’s office holds both prosecutorial and regulatory responsibilities and 
pursues both civil and criminal cases arising from the same circumstances. Federal prosecutors 
invariably cooperate and coordinate with regulatory counterparts, supra note 91, while Spitzer, 
at least, often disrespected federal agencies. See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: 
State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 117 (2004). 
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should articulate the rationales of governance reforms they proffer when 
settling cases using DPAs.126 
A.  AIG’s Governance Profile 
A profile of AIG’s corporate governance highlights factors that 
prosecutors need to understand when targeting a business organization. 
Such attributes are important to grasp as they reflect the inner workings 
and mechanisms of a company. Along with the personnel involved, a 
company’s governance attributes are what makes the company succeed. 
In this case, readily discernible matters included a nimble, innovative, 
employee-driven culture with global reach; a diverse shareholder mix 
that included heavy insider ownership, considerable retail ownership, 
and a mix of passive and activist institutional shareholders; deep and 
longstanding internal control systems; and a fractious board with 
members debating executive succession planning. A rudimentary grasp 
of such examples of a corporate governance structure would greatly 
assist a prosecutor looking to formulate a profile to help make decisions 
about whether to charge a company or individuals and whether to 
proceed with an indictment and prosecution or settle.  
Scale. AIG’s foundations were domestic insurance operations 
assembled in the 1960s by Greenberg, along with a collection of 
international insurance businesses created during the previous five 
decades by the American international business pioneer, Cornelius 
Vander Starr.127 From 1969, when AIG went public, to 2004, the total 
market value of AIG’s stock rose from $300 million to $150 billion—an 
increase of approximately 19,000% compared to the 700% increase in 
the S&P 500.128 By 2004, AIG employed 80,000 people, earned more 
than $11 billion annually, and commanded total assets exceeding $500 
                                                                                                                     
 126. The case study arose out of my collaboration on a book with Greenberg. See generally 
MAURICE R. GREENBERG & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY (2013). It is based on 
my original research into extant public materials, as well as considerable non-public materials, 
including documents obtained under New York State’s Freedom of Information Law, and 
interviews with many participants. Some of those interviewed requested anonymity; some 
requests for interviews were declined. The result is an imperfect record of events, offering the 
benefits, along with the limits, of case studies as a research method. See generally ROBERT K. 
YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (4th ed. 2009) (describing the use of case 
studies as a research method and how they are applied in practice). Single-event case studies 
must be interpreted cautiously and lessons drawn narrowly to avoid incorrect causal 
explanations. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1522–24 (2004); see also supra note 125 (acknowledging that the AIG 
case may appear sui generis, but also noting how its high stakes and possible repetition warrant 
studying it). In this instance, the case study is supplemented by analysis and examples elsewhere 
in this Article and is sufficiently reliable to support the two prescriptions noted. 
 127. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 5–6. 
 128. See C.J. Prince, CEO of the Year 2003, CHIEF EXEC. MAG. (July 1, 2003), 
http://chiefexecutive.net/ceo-of-the-year-2003. 
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billion.129 It was the largest insurance company in history.  
Innovative Internationalists. AIG’s culture valued product 
innovation. The company pioneered insurance covering a variety of 
unusual risks, such as armies, kidnapping, oil pipelines and rigs, 
satellites, and shipping, which helped American companies expand 
internationally in the process that evolved into globalization.130 In 
addition, despite its size, AIG fostered this innovation by creating 
mechanisms within the company that could quickly respond to a need 
for new products,131 even if the need was on the other side of the 
world.132 Decades before globalization, AIG opened markets not only in 
Mao’s China133 but also behind the Iron Curtain in the Soviet Union and 
its Eastern European satellites.134 AIG also opened markets in Japan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Latin America, the Middle East, and 
Africa.135  
Employees. AIG’s management cultivated an employee-centric 
                                                                                                                     
 129. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 172. 
 130. Id. at 46–47. 
 131. AIG led the charge to change the world’s view of service industries. International 
trade conventions had long covered trade in goods, but countries discriminated against service 
providers, such as AIG. Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the company led efforts by 
scores of other companies and successive U.S. Trade Representatives, from the Carter to the 
Clinton administrations, finally winning in 1997’s World Trade Organization financial services 
agreement. Many scholars and policy analysts contributed independent research that reached the 
same conclusions about the value of trade in services globally. E.g., GEZA FEKETEKUTY, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: AN OVERVIEW AND BLUEPRINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS 238–39 
(1988); Jagdish N. Bhagwari, Trade in Services and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1 THE 
WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 551 (1987) (arguing that developing countries perceive developed 
countries as seeking removal of barriers on trade in goods instead of establishing quid pro quo 
relationships); accord RONALD KENT SHELP, BEYOND INDUSTRIALIZATION: ASCENDANCY OF THE 
GLOBAL SERVICE ECONOMY 208–12 (1981) (Shelp was an AIG government relations employee). 
 132. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 62, 66, 80, 84–85, 89–90, 98, 111–
12, 121. For example, AIG was among the first substantial American companies to do business 
in China in the twentieth century. Starr’s businesses, founded in China in 1919, were ousted 
along with all other foreign companies in 1949 amid its civil war, which was followed by the 
nation’s isolation for several decades. After the thawing of China–U.S. relations in 1972, 
Greenberg undertook an arduous process that spanned through 1992. The result: AIG was the 
first foreign insurance company licensed by China in the modern period and among the first 
large foreign companies to resume business there. See DAVID M. LAMPTON, SAME BED, 
DIFFERENT DREAMS: MANAGING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 1989–2000, at 348–52 (2001). 
 133. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 97–98. 
 134. Id. at 64–68. 
 135. As AIG grew into a leading American international insurance company, its interests 
and activities became increasingly intertwined with those of the United States. For example, it 
insured equipment used in national intelligence gathering exercises and military commitments. 
More broadly, AIG fought for open trade in dozens of countries and in several important global 
trade negotiations alongside U.S. trade negotiators. It joined forces with the United States 
government in numerous episodes promoting democracy and capitalism in the Soviet Union, 
Iran, Korea, Nigeria, Peru, and Vietnam—to name a few.  
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atmosphere by stressing mutual loyalty and never leaving any employee 
behind, whether navigating treachery abroad or facing personal crises at 
home.136 A distinguished cohort among AIG employees were the 
“mobile overseas persons” or M.O.P.s. This group did service stints in 
numerous countries during their career, as many as ten to fifteen, taking 
two-to-three year terms in each place. Akin to the U.S. Foreign Service, 
they were corporate ambassadors who could troubleshoot the thorniest 
problem anywhere in the world.137 
Employee compensation was long-term, with most payoffs deferred 
until age sixty-five.138 In the corporate restructurings that occurred to 
take AIG public, one company that contributed assets to AIG, Starr 
International Co. (SICO), also received shares of AIG’s stock.139 A 
small group of SICO’s closest business associates, including Greenberg, 
owned all the SICO stock, which entitled them to all the AIG shares 
received in exchange.140 They decided instead to preserve a portion of 
the AIG shares for SICO’s future corporate use. An important use, made 
over the next three decades, was providing incentive compensation to 
AIG managers paid in AIG shares.141 The incentives were long-term: 
awards were made annually based on the previous two years’ 
performance, but shares did not vest until age sixty-five.142  
AIG did not enter into employment contracts with any employee, 
from the CEO to underwriter trainees, as these were not considered 
necessary for employee security or desirable from an incentives 
perspective.143 Valuing experience highly, AIG eschewed mandatory 
retirement for employees, and many employees, including senior 
management, worked into their seventies and eighties.144 
Shareholders. Many AIG employees were also shareholders with 
large portions of their net worth in AIG stock.145 SICO continued to 
                                                                                                                     
 136. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 40, 45. 
 137. Id. at 50. 
 138. Id. at 39. 
 139. See Starr Int’l Co. v. AIG, 648 F. Supp. 2d 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 140. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 39.  
 141. Id.  
 142. The SICO-funded AIG compensation plan had some kinship to Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans that Louis Kelso developed in the same time period. See LOUIS O. KELSO & 
MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 210–13 (1958); LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA 
HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP REVOLUTION 59–66 
(1986) (describing Employee Stock Ownership Plans); Andrew W. Stumpff, Fifty Years of 
Utopia: A Half-Century After Louis Kelso’s The Capitalist Manifesto, A Look Back at the Weird 
History of the ESOP, 62 TAX LAW. 419, 425–26 (2009) (noting how ESOPs gained momentum 
after passage of 1974’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act, ERISA, which provided 
favorable tax treatment). 
 143.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 45. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 40.  
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own a large percentage of AIG’s stock, which portion eventually 
declined to 12% in 2005 due to AIG’s growth.146 AIG’s other 
management–directors owned or controlled substantial shares, and the 
company earned a reputation as a “core holding” for many portfolios, 
including state pension funds.147 AIG’s large size, with a market 
capitalization reaching $180 billion, made it a choice target of 
institutional investors during the corporate governance movement, 
particularly during the push to enable shareholders to nominate directors 
(the proxy access movement).148 
Controls. AIG developed sophisticated systems of internal control. 
These dated to the 1970s when global operations demanded aggregating 
financial and insurance information arising from millions of 
transactions annually in more than 100 countries.149 AIG established an 
audit committee that was led by board members and staffed by senior 
accounting officials. They divided AIG’s operational world into thirty 
reporting regions, appointed controllers for each, and established 
foreign and domestic internal auditors to oversee the entire operation.150  
By 1984, AIG won a AAA credit rating, which enabled it to 
diversify earnings by expanding into a few other fields besides 
insurance.151 AIG moved into private equity, aircraft leasing, global 
infrastructure funds, and financial products.152 The latter, called the FP 
division, required adding even more elaborate internal controls because 
it managed an investment portfolio not subject to the liability reserve 
requirements of insurance companies.153 Several distinct internal 
groups, as well as the outside auditor, consistently monitored the FP 
division’s risk portfolio. Risk management was part of AIG’s corporate 
DNA.154  
                                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 203–04.  
 147. See RODDY BOYD, FATAL RISK: A CAUTIONARY TALE OF AIG’S CORPORATE SUICIDE 
45 (2011). 
 148. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 123–24 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 149. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 50–51. 
 150. Id. at 50–51. 
 151. Id. at 140. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 146–47.  
 154. Nevertheless, even the most rigorous internal controls can be porous as AIG 
discovered in two instances during the period following Enron and Sarbanes–Oxley. In one, a 
junior manager at a small AIG subsidiary wrote a policy that apparently enabled another party, a 
small telecom supplier called Brightpoint, to manipulate its financial results. The SEC 
threatened suit, but AIG settled the case for $10 million and allowed an SEC-designated monitor 
to roam around AIG’s other subsidiaries in search of any similar problems, which did not appear 
to exist. See SEC v. Brightpoint, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18340, 2003 WL 22110371 (Sept. 
11, 2003). In the second case, the SEC and the DOJ asserted that the company’s Financial 
Products (FP) division aided violation of accounting rules by PNC Bank when providing asset 
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Directors. AIG’s founding corporate board in 1967 included the 
luminaries who would spend their careers making AIG the world’s 
largest insurance company. As traditional inside directors, they knew 
the company and the insurance business well, and were world travelers 
who understood the demands of building a global financial services 
company.155 From 1984, when AIG listed on the NYSE, stock exchange 
rules, federal securities law, state court rulings, and institutional 
investor advocacy all gradually required or induced AIG to add 
increasing numbers of outside directors.156 By the early 2000s, outside 
directors comprised a majority of AIG’s board, which created a culture 
in which outside directors were newly inspired to challenge inside 
directors.157 The traditional mutually supportive and respectful 
relationship among board members frayed. 
Succession. During the early 2000s, part of AIG’s corporate 
objectives included planning for CEO succession.158 Succession is a 
challenging process, especially when the company’s leader has invested 
his career and identity in the company, as Greenberg had with AIG.159 
Nevertheless, AIG’s board and Greenberg began working on succession 
in 2000, when Greenberg was seventy-five.160 They narrowed the 
potential successors down to two senior managers—both of whom were 
in their early fifties.161 By late 2004, Greenberg and the board reached 
an understanding that one of those two would become CEO for a trial 
period starting on the company’s annual meeting in June 2005, while 
Greenberg remained chairman.162 Despite the arrangement, some 
directors worried that such a transition would result in Greenberg, a 
                                                                                                                     
management services. This was settled using a deferred prosecution agreement that called for a 
monitor to assure that the FP division did not offer products that other parties could use to 
manipulate accounting records, along with payment of $126 million. See SEC v. AIG, Litigation 
Release No. 18985, 2004 WL 2721457 (Nov. 30, 2004); American International Group, Inc. 
Enters into Agreements with the United States, DEP’T JUSTICE (Nov. 30, 2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/November/04_crm_764.htm. This monitor’s performance 
would prove dismal during these years leading to the financial crisis of 2008 in which AIG 
played a central role. See infra text accompanying notes 379–82. 
 155.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 149. 
 156. Id. at 150; see also Joseph B. Treaster, Some A.I.G. Shareholders to Press for More 
Independent Board, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/15/business/
some-aig-shareholders-to-press-for-more-independent-board.html; Joseph B. Treaster, A.I.G. 
Head Will Consider Altering Board, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/05/18/business/aig-head-will-consider-altering-board.html. 
 157. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 155. 
 158. Id. at 163. 
 159. See Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 351, 380 (2011). 
 160. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 163. 
 161. Id. at 155, 163. 
 162.  Id. at 163. 
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formidable figure, overshadowing the CEO-elect.163 A faction of 
outside directors even retained special counsel to advise them on 
succession.164 Conversations were continuing in early 2005 when 
prosecutors began a probe into AIG.165 
B.  Ex Ante Miscalculation 
Eliot L. Spitzer, attorney general of New York, started the 2005 
probe into AIG.166 Spitzer made a name for himself investigating 
prominent companies and people. He became famous for controversial 
tactics and disrespecting corporate governance realities.167 For instance, 
in 2004, Spitzer aimed at insurance brokers for bid rigging by filing a 
civil case against Marsh & McLennan Companies.168 He threatened 
criminal charges against the firm as a bludgeon to induce the board’s 
cooperation in seeking the resignation of its CEO.169 Spitzer forced the 
resignation by declaring that he would not negotiate with Marsh’s board 
while the incumbent remained chief executive.170 Spitzer’s ultimatum 
overstepped prosecutorial bounds into the realm of corporate 
governance. 
Intervention. In February 2005, Spitzer targeted AIG and 
Greenberg.171 Some of AIG’s outside directors were concerned about 
corporate liability or personal liability, while one faction was focused 
on succession. This latter faction relied heavily on the lawyer they had 
retained four months earlier.172 These directors and their lawyer became 
not merely cooperative, but aligned with Spitzer.173 It is not clear why 
they did so, but their alignment shifted the governance machinery in 
favor of a more rapid and complete succession than was originally 
agreed upon.174  
Through early March, AIG’s auditor was prepared to sign off on the 
company’s 2004 financial statements.175 But the auditor soon made a 
                                                                                                                     
 163.  Id. at 186. 
 164.  Id. at 162. 
 165.  Id. at 181–87. 
 166. Id. at 172–79. 
 167. See, e.g., Kulbir Walha & Edward E. Filusch, Note, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against 
Corporate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study of Eliot 
Spitzer and Marsh & McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111, 1111 (2005). 
 168.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 175. 
 169.  Id.  
 170. Id.; see also Joseph B. Treaster, Broker Accused of Rigging Bids for Insurance, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/15/business/15insure.html. 
 171. See BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 229–30 
(2006); PETER ELKIND, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE RISE AND FALL OF ELIOT SPITZER 84 (2010).  
 172.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 180–82. 
 173.  Id. at 180–82. 
 174.  Id. at 185–86. 
 175.  Id. at 182. 
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turnabout, again for reasons that are not clear except that the auditor 
faced extraordinary pressure—either from the outside director faction, 
lawyers, or prosecutors—amid great sensitivity given Andersen’s recent 
collapse.176 Spitzer questioned AIG’s accounting for a transaction it had 
made in 2000 with a large reinsurance company called Gen Re, which 
was notorious for engaging in aggressive reinsurance deals with many 
other insurance companies.177 Though the Gen Re deal proved trivial as 
the saga played out over the next seven years, Spitzer’s questions 
became ominous threats that drove AIG’s corporate governance.178 
On Sunday, March 13, before an investigation had been conducted, 
AIG’s outside directors held a special meeting.179 They debated the 
risks to AIG of a corporate indictment, shared concerns about personal 
liability, and addressed the pending succession issue.180 At that meeting, 
the auditors dropped a bombshell, saying they would not certify the 
2004 financials unless the board got Greenberg to resign.181 Aside from 
not having conducted any investigation, the auditors clearly crossed a 
line with such a threat.  
Spitzer had previously issued a subpoena requesting that Greenberg 
testify about Gen Re and other unspecified matters.182 AIG’s 
employment manuals instructed employees to cooperate in any 
investigation.183 Such cooperation commitments are now common in 
corporate employment manuals, prompted by the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines and DOJ practice of giving corporations credit 
for cooperation.184 One director asked whether Greenberg would answer 
all of Spitzer’s questions or take the Fifth.185 Greenberg explained that, 
although he had nothing to hide, his lawyers adamantly advised taking 
the Fifth because Spitzer refused to show him documents or limit the 
scope of questioning.186 Some directors seemed to believe that taking 
the Fifth would violate AIG’s employment manuals, although it is 
unclear as a legal and prudential matter that such a conclusion is 
                                                                                                                     
 176.  Id. at 183–84. 
 177.  Id. at 177–78. 
 178.  Id. at 177–80. 
 179. Id. at 179–80. 
 180.  Id. at 181–87. 
 181.  Id. at 182–84. 
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 184. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2010). 
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valid.187 
At the end of the lengthy meeting, the directors asked Greenberg to 
resign.188 Motives were mixed, however, since no investigation had 
been conducted; the decision was made in the context of ongoing 
negotiations over succession; the auditors exerted unorthodox pressure; 
and no one knew whether taking the Fifth violated company policy in 
these circumstances.189 This was a manifestation of prosecutorial 
prerogative conjoined to a new model of corporate governance in which 
power had been reposed in outside directors advised by outside counsel 
and supported by outside auditors. It showed how the prosecutorial 
power met a corporate governance struggle that the prosecutor did not 
seem to understand. 
Investigation. After the prosecutorial intervention in March, AIG’s 
auditors and outside counsel conducted an investigation during April, 
May, and June. They restated AIG’s accounting statements for the 
previous five years, though the auditor had certified them during that 
time.190 The firm cooperated with Spitzer, going beyond ordinary 
cooperation to the point of aligning their interests with those of 
Spitzer.191 The changes cut shareholders’ equity, cumulatively across 
five years, by 2.7% in total and net income by 2.1% per year.192 A 
longstanding rule of thumb in corporate accounting treated variations of 
                                                                                                                     
 187. Cf. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (endorsing employee objection 
on constitutional grounds concerning right to counsel and due process, to prosecutorial 
insistence that corporation refuse to cover legal defense expenses for any employee pleading the 
Fifth). 
 188. MASTERS, supra note 171, at 236–38. 
 189.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 184–85, 187. 
 190. Accounting restatements became so common during the mid-2000s, that officials 
cautioned about restatements that were themselves suspect. E.g., John White, Dir. of the Div. of 
Corp. Fin., SEC, Corporation Finance in 2008—A Focus on Financial Reporting at the 35th 
Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 23, 2008) (transcript available at 
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expressed and proposals made by an SEC Advisory Committee); see also Marlene Plumlee & 
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 191. See Ian McDonald & Theo Francis, Spitzer Expects a Civil Settlement with AIG, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2005), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB111263623864097279. 
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$2.26 billion and income $4 billion (for the whole period), but AIG owned $800 billion in assets 
and earned nearly $10 billion annually. Eileen Alt Powell, AIG Files Report, Admits to Some 
Improprieties, SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 1, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/
article.php?id=2772694&itype=NGPSID; Joann Weiner, AIG’s Former Chief Greenberg Suing 
Feds for Bailing Out His Company, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2013, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2013/02/23/aigs-ex-chief-greenberg-
says-fed-bailout-was-wrong/. 
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less than 5% as immaterial.193 Although the SEC abrogated that custom 
in 1999, auditors signed off on reports so long as they were within 5% 
of their calculations of a fair financial picture, as AIG’s were.194 The 
changes, moreover, congregated in areas where there had been 
controversy about the proper accounting for certain types of transactions 
and which auditors had debated for years.195 
The restatement did not provide probable cause for a criminal case, 
and one was never filed against Greenberg or AIG.196 Spitzer filed a 
civil case against Greenberg, under New York’s Martin Act, initially 
based on seven changes reflected in the restatement.197 He eventually 
dropped all claims except for the Gen Re matter and one other issue in a 
case that continues unresolved today, more than seven years later.198 
Nor did the restatement vindicate the decision to seek Greenberg’s 
resignation; if it defined the threshold for determining to oust a CEO, 
few CEOs of large public corporations would remain in office for 
long.199  
Nevertheless, the restatement, along with Greenberg’s resignation, 
caused AIG’s stock price to drop dramatically and rating agencies to 
slash its AAA rating.200 Immediate direct costs to shareholders 
                                                                                                                     
 193.  SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211). 
 194. See id.  
 195. Examples applicable to the insurance industry included accounting for finite insurance 
transactions and for liability reserves. Examples applicable to all companies concerned topics 
such as accounting for equity-based compensation and for special purpose entities. After the 
restatement was released in May 2005, Greenberg’s lawyers and accountants spent the next two 
months examining every change made in it. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 
196. Completed on July 26, 2005, their detailed memorandum challenged every change point-
by-point. Id. 
 196. The only criminal charges arising out of the entire affair targeted one AIG employee 
and six Gen Re employees over the AIG–Gen Re transaction. The case resulted in early plea 
agreements by two Gen Re employees who became the government’s star witnesses against the 
others. After seven years of litigation, which included a trial, appeal, and order for a new trial, 
United States v. Ferguson, 653 F.3d 61, 68–69, 95 (2d Cir. 2011), the case resulted in individual 
deferred prosecution agreements in which the defendants did not admit guilt. The appellate court 
characterized the testimony of one of the government’s star witnesses as “suspicious.” Id. at 71. 
 197.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 191, 196. 
 198. See People v. Greenberg, No. 401720/2005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed May 26, 2005). The 
New York Court of Appeals accepted the case to adjudicate the validity of the Martin Act, 
which Greenberg argued was preempted by federal securities laws. Under federal law and most 
state laws, proving business fraud requires “scienter,” referring to a mental state evincing a 
deliberate intention to deceive, which does not purport to be a requirement under the Martin 
Act. See Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal 
Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 302 (2003); see also People v. Greenberg, 994 N.E.2d 838 
(N.Y. 2013) (holding that it would not pass on the issue of federal preemption). 
 199.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 201. 
 200.  Id. at 230. 
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exceeded several billion dollars—an amount greater than the 
restatement and punishment to shareholders that suggested prosecutorial 
confusion about corporate governance.201 Worse, AIG settled with 
Spitzer and other government authorities under a DPA that would prove 
even more costly because of the failure to relate its governance terms to 
AIG’s governance realities.  
C.  Ex Post Standardization 
After Greenberg’s early resignation, while prosecutors continued to 
hold the threat of prosecution over AIG, outside counsel negotiated 
governance reforms with Spitzer.202 Drafts of the agreement recited 
actions already taken, including Greenberg’s resignation, and prescribed 
further changes.203 As part of these governance reforms, the board opted 
to separate the roles of the board chairman and CEO.204 Splitting the 
functions of CEO from board chairman had become fashionable, seen 
by many as a best practice.205 It manifested the same rationale of 
prescriptions for adding outside directors, a desire to reduce the 
boardroom power of the CEO. At AIG, this separation had little to do 
with its prevailing governance realities and contrasted sharply with the 
previous succession plan, which, while entailing a separation of those 
functions, was tailored to the needs of the transition. As will be 
elaborated below, three years later, amid the financial crisis of 2008, it 
became clear that the separation of functions had failed and the board 
repealed it. 
Off-the-Rack Governance. A pivotal clause in the Spitzer–AIG 
agreement required the board to hire a special advisor to identify 
additional outside director nominees and to prescribe best practices on 
governance issues.206 That advisor, Arthur Levitt, a former SEC 
                                                                                                                     
 201.  Id. at 201. 
 202. See id. at 22 & n.6 (citing e-mail from Martin Flumenbaum, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton & Garrison, LLP, to Eliot Spitzer et al. (July 19, 2005), FOIL 09777 011247–
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chairman, directed a list of reforms, all of which were standard terms he 
said were best practices and all of which AIG was required to adopt.207 
Along with the ill-fated endorsement of splitting the identities of the 
chairman and CEO, reforms called for adding even more outside 
directors,208 holding executive sessions of the board that excluded any 
management directors, eliminating the executive committee, imposing 
mandatory director retirement at age seventy-three, and barring any 
former chief executive from serving on AIG’s board.209 None of these 
changes had anything particularly to do with AIG or its needs. In fact, 
Levitt chose his recommended reforms after consulting shareholder 
advocates, corporate governance experts, and selected directors210—but 
none of AIG’s management, employees, or largest shareholders.  
A telling mismatch between AIG’s realities and Levitt’s changes 
concerned abolishing the executive committee. Levitt supported that 
recommendation by saying that executive committees are “often a 
symbol of board cronyism.”211 This general impression said nothing 
about the committee’s quality or value at AIG. It had consisted of 
Greenberg and four outside directors, avoiding cronyism, and had a 
clear business rationale: to enable nimble operations in a dynamic 
global environment, reflected in AIG’s entrepreneurial and 
internationalist culture. 
Another ill-suited reform concerned age limits for directors. AIG’s 
traditional employee-centric philosophy and its reliance on experienced 
mobile overseas personnel led it to embrace employees wishing to work 
beyond traditional retirement ages at other companies. People could 
retire at age sixty-five, and many did. But a large number of AIG 
employees, including many in senior management and on the board, 
continued working well into their seventies or eighties.212 Greenberg 
was seventy-nine at the time of his forced resignation.213 While age 
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limits for directors were trendy during this period—with some 40% of 
Fortune 1000 companies adopting them in response to urgings from 
governance gurus such as CalPERS—they were an anomaly at AIG.214  
Controls. The Spitzer–AIG DPA prescribed and the board adopted a 
different set of committees, officers, and reporting lines to handle matters of 
control and compliance.215 This approach put the form of internal controls 
above the substance, thereby threatening AIG’s rigorous risk management. 
For example, controls at the FP division had been designed to assure that 
no transaction would jeopardize AIG’s AAA credit rating.216 All 
transactions were negotiated on the strength of that rating, which 
enabled AIG to assure counterparties of its ability to make good on its 
obligations at low cost, without posting collateral or pledging assets.217 
Such controls kept the FP division from taking on too much risk and 
saddling the company with debts that would threaten AIG’s insurance 
businesses.218  
Employees. The board’s new practice of giving employment 
contracts to executives is a more tangible example of AIG’s 
transformation.219 No AIG employee, from the CEO to underwriter 
trainees, had ever had an employment contract.220 Further, AIG adopted 
new bonus policies that moved from the long-term orientation of the 
employee compensation program run for three decades under 
Greenberg’s stewardship toward short-term incentives, including at the 
FP division.221 All these corporate governance changes would change 
AIG, though not in the ways that prosecutors or executives would have 
hoped. Short-term incentives, combined with slackened controls, would 
prove perilous.  
Chaos. In April 2005, the FP division began writing credit default 
swaps on increasingly risky pools of mortgage-related debt, called 
“subprime.”222 During 2005, the FP division’s portfolio steadily declined 
                                                                                                                     
 214.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 228. 
 215.  Id. at 229–31. 
 216.  Id. at 229. 
 217.  Id. at 229–30. 
 218.  Id. at 230. 
 219.  Id. at 231. 
 220.  Id.  
 221. Id. Today’s intense debates over executive compensation stress the value of incentives 
driven by long-term compared to short-term compensation, which AIG understood for decades 
before such debates. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive 
Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 365 n.23 
(2009). 
 222. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 231. Credit default swaps are 
contracts in which a lender reduces its risk of exposure to loss due to borrower default by 
swapping that risk to another party, essentially an insurer, who bears that risk in exchange for a 
fee. Subprime pools of mortgage related debt gathered loans taken by homebuyers with 
relatively poor credit histories. That increased the risk of default on any given loan; but those 
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in quality; it started with a small fraction of subprime mortgage pools and 
became almost entirely subprime.223 By June 2007, AIG had written $80 
billion of swaps on the riskiest mortgage pools, quintupling its 2005 
position, all unhedged.224 Many of the swaps required AIG to post cash 
collateral if AIG’s credit rating fell or the value of covered contracts 
declined.225 Following industry practice, AIG subsidiaries historically 
lent securities to borrowers in exchange for cash collateral that would be 
invested in short-term, low-risk investments to gain modest interest.226 
From 2006 through 2008, AIG greatly increased these stakes, taking 
longer-term, riskier assets, including mortgage backed securities.227  
At the same time, a global financial crisis had been brewing due to a 
combination of forces that overheated real estate markets worldwide.228 
During 2007, the U.S. housing market weakened, contributing to an 
intertwined series of economic problems that spread globally into a 
financial crisis. Mortgage-related assets began to decline in value. From 
mid-2007 to late 2008, these problems gathered momentum and 
amplified worldwide. AIG’s liquidity problems began to emerge in July 
2007 when customers requested that AIG post cash collateral amid the 
weakening market.229 
AIG faced a growing gap between its duty to return that cash 
collateral to counterparties and the fair value of the mortgage securities 
its insurance subsidiaries bought with it.230 The combination of this gap 
                                                                                                                     
who sold pools of such loans sliced them into tranches with varying degrees of risk. The FP 
division backstopped the tranches that deal designers called “super senior,” denoting that the 
risk of default was remote. In many cases, it appears that these firms misrepresented the quality 
of the pools—what AIG was told were “super senior” were the bottom of the barrel. Id.  
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 231.  
 225.  Id. at 232. 
 226.  Id.  
 227. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN STORY OF 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 328 (2010).  
 228. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 232; see Lawrence A. Cunningham & 
David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis 
Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 49 n.24 (2009). Factors 
included: (1) U.S. policy overstimulated appetites for home ownership and kept interest rates 
low for too long; (2) regulation of financial institutions was poor, as commercial banks fed the 
appetite for home ownership with generous mortgages while investment banks churned demand 
with complex financial products and increased leverage; (3) rating agencies failed to analyze 
many financial products adequately and the lack of trading in such products on organized 
markets made them difficult to value; and (4) regulators at the SEC failed to monitor the 
leverage of many financial institutions, whose debt levels rose to as much as 30–40 times capital 
and, in AIG’s case, regulators at the Office of Thrift Supervision, which had authority because 
AIG owned a savings and loan association, simply ignored any signs of trouble. GREENBERG & 
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 232. 
 229.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 232. 
 230. Id. at 233; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-751, REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
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and the escalating collateral calls facing the FP division squeezed AIG’s 
liquidity.231 But the mounting turmoil escaped the attention of AIG’s 
senior management and board, as the company’s internal controls 
failed.232 It was not until June 2008 that AIG’s board responded by 
asking the CEO to resign and the board chairman to assume the role of 
CEO as well, repudiating an important part of the governance reforms 
begun three years earlier.233 The repair efforts came too late, however, as 
the company sailed into the financial crisis to be taken over by the U.S. 
government in September 2008.  
Causation, Correlation, and Best Practices. One must ask whether 
the governance changes caused AIG’s role in the crisis or were merely 
correlated with it.234 Investigation and testimony point to the changes 
playing a causal role. Forensic reports on the crisis blamed AIG’s role in 
the crisis on governance, risk management, and internal control problems 
during 2007 and 2008.235 Testimonial evidence from AIG’s general 
counsel, not a Greenberg ally, said that after Greenberg left “there was 
no one in charge.”236 The type and scale of practices at the FP division 
and at the insurance subsidiaries were novel adventures for AIG 
inconsistent with its cautious risk management. AIG’s outside auditors 
discovered the gathering crisis in February 2008 and wrote to its 
chairman a scathing critique of top management and the governance and 
control environment they had created.237 The governance prescriptions 
clearly had a causal role in AIG’s near destruction.238 
                                                                                                                     
RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 5, 17 
(2011).  
 231.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 233. 
 232. By February 2008, it had become clear to AIG’s outside auditors that disaster was coming. It 
reported a chilling and pervasive problem at the new AIG: an appreciation of risk and risk 
management, once a defining trait of AIG, had been pushed out of its corporate culture. The auditor 
provided detailed and scathing criticism of AIG’s top three executives. See id. at 235 (reprinting 
the auditor’s notes).  
 233. Press Release, AIG, AIG Names Robert B. Willumstad Chief Executive Officer (June 
15, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/15/idUS65315+15-Jun-
2008+BW20080615.  
 234. A stronger version of this inquiry asks whether, had Greenberg not been replaced, 
AIG’s role in the crisis would have been diminished. Many believe that the answer is yes, 
including leading insurance industry executives who knew AIG and Greenberg well enough to 
be in good positions to make a judgment. See Michael Loney, 30 Years in Insurance: Learning 
the Hard Way, REACTIONS, Apr. 1, 2011 (quoting Jack Byrne, former chairman of the insurance 
companies GEICO and Fireman’s Fund). 
 235. E.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT 
ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 55 (2010). 
 236. Id. at 52 n.144 (quoting AIG General Counsel Anastasia Kelly). 
 237. See supra note 232. Additional evidence, and another culprit, appears in the failure to 
detect any problems by an outside monitor installed at the company in another DPA on an 
earlier matter. See infra text accompanying notes 375–82.  
 238. Another hypothesis attributes the problems at AIG in 2008 not to anything that 
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The case for a causal connection is also supported by the evidence that 
the reforms implemented at AIG reflected an unfortunate tendency among 
corporate governance experts to celebrate best practices. That can 
readily lead to believing that certain devices are so appealing that they 
are suitable for every company without regard to particular governance 
realities. Many of those devices—such as making outside directors 
dominant on the board, separating the chairman and CEO roles, 
abolishing the executive committee, and redesigning control oversight 
by creating new offices and committees—were put into place at AIG 
after the Spitzer-led prosecution and were ordained by Arthur Levitt, 
who is considered a leading expert on the subject.239  
But these and other changes—including offering employment 
contracts with short-term bonuses and imposing age limits for 
directors—were implemented at AIG without considering its existing 
corporate governance attributes, including its entrepreneurial culture, 
employee-centric philosophy, employee ownership, long-term incentive 
program, absence of employment contracts, strict internal control 
regimens, and reliance on experienced and engaged directors.240  
When evaluating how to proceed against corporate targets, 
prosecutors, in both formal guidelines and practice, tend to emphasize 
compliance programs and cooperation.241 The AIG case study indicates 
that such an isolated focus can be perilous. Prosecutors must understand 
and work within a corporation’s overall corporate governance profile 
rather than ignore it (or try to revolutionize it). The AIG case study 
suggests the value of prosecutors taking an integrated approach to 
corporate governance by considering it from the outset to the end of a 
case, including in settlement under a DPA. The next Part pursues this 
suggestion more comprehensively.  
III.  AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
Given the degree of controversy surrounding DPAs, it is tempting to 
delineate a precise conceptual model of their legitimacy and to prescribe 
exactly which terms are valid and which should be seen as off-limits. 
This Part considers alternatives and, rather than offering a precise 
formula, calls for particular explanations of chosen terms based on an 
initial investigation. The articulations would then form a body of 
knowledge providing considerable systemic advantages for the public 
and prosecutors alike. Section A explores DPAs in conceptual and 
                                                                                                                     
occurred after Greenberg left in early 2005 but to the complexity of the company’s structure or 
practices (often described as “byzantine”) that existed in 2005 and before. Research conducted 
for this Article did not find evidence to support that conjecture.  
 239.  GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 224. 
 240.  See supra notes 206–214 and accompanying text. 
 241.  See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/1
2014] DEFERRED PROSECUTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 41 
 
analytical terms to define their proper scope, best seen as neither 
contract nor regulation, but as exercises of prosecutorial discretion. It 
concludes that such discretion warrants asking prosecutors to articulate 
the rationales of governance terms they proffer based on ex ante 
investigation. Section B explains the benefits of this approach compared 
to alternatives. Section C considers costs and various objections. 
A.  Conceptualization: Contract, Regulation, Discretion 
The following discussion first probes the defining attributes of DPAs 
and then draws implications about their proper scope. Alternative 
conceptions view DPAs as pure contract (implicitly the status quo 
view), pure regulation (a stance directly at odds with the status quo), or 
as a device derived from prosecutorial discretion (the conception that 
emerges from the following analysis as most faithful to reality). To 
summarize: (1) under the contractual conception, no terms are off limits 
and bargains are policed solely by contract doctrines; (2) under the 
regulatory conception, the proper terms of DPAs would be exceedingly 
narrow, given the superiority of ex ante legislation or administrative 
rulemaking, putting governance terms off-limits; and (3) under the 
discretionary conception, the most apt, the range of proper terms is 
open-ended, and certainly includes governance terms, but warrants 
prudential limitation given broad prosecutorial power and limited 
judicial review.  
1.  Pure Contract? The Implicit Status Quo Conception 
Practice. The current practice concerning DPAs implicitly assumes 
that they are pure contracts to be governed primarily by contract law. 
No business organization is obliged to enter into one. Companies differ 
in their response to prosecutorial overtures due to variation among 
governance participants such as directors, chief executives, general 
counsel, and outside counsel. Every case differs due to variables such as 
the scope of alleged wrongdoing, the relative difficulty of proof, the 
costs of defending a case, and the risk of losing customers or facing 
other constituent defections. Terms are negotiated and defense counsels, 
as well as the organized defense bar, push back on given terms in 
particular cases. As a result, not all DPAs or all terms in them should be 
seen as impositions akin to regulation.  
Indeed, it seems that details venturing beyond fines and compliance 
into the deeper realms of corporate governance are more likely subject 
to greater negotiation. In any event, both sides to DPAs find the deals 
advantageous, each getting and giving something. At minimum, both 
sides avoid the costs and risks of a trial. In some cases, companies may 
find some governance changes appealing independent of the 
prosecutor’s presence. Or prosecutors might propose simply adhering to 
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requirements to which a company is committed, such as to maintain as 
many outside directors as applicable stock exchange rules require.242 
Prosecutors may value the bragging rights more highly as a way to 
boost a DPA’s deterrence power.243 In such cases, including governance 
terms in a DPA is an inexpensive way to achieve closure.  
Theory and Doctrine. Were DPAs purely contractual, contract theory 
would be relevant to the framework for assessing DPAs, and they would 
presumably pass muster given the foregoing observations about their 
features. They would be governed by the general law of contracts, with 
policing according to such doctrines as duress, illegal bargain, and 
unconscionability.244 That is generally how plea agreements are 
handled. Courts declare that plea agreements are simply another form of 
contract,245 while appreciating special features emanating from 
constitutional protections,246 and recognizing that plea agreements are 
formed only upon judicial approval in the settlement of a pending 
criminal action.247 
In DPAs, the validity of certain terms, such as waivers of attorney–
client privilege and restrictions on reimbursing legal fees, is suspect. In 
fact, since a federal court ruled that such terms are out of bounds in a 
DPA, the DOJ has eschewed them.248 This sequence of events is 
evidence that the contractual conception—and the status quo based on 
it—has some purchase. Private parties can obtain judicial review and 
declarations of unenforceability on the grounds that some terms 
constitute illegal bargains. Certainly, it indicates the prospect and 
pressure of judicial review and a constraint on the exertion of excessive 
prosecutorial bargaining power. 
Limits. Yet there are aspects of the DPA process that call the 
contractual conception into question. The balance of power in DPA 
negotiations may heavily favor prosecutors. First, companies know that 
an indictment could mean destruction, as in the case of Arthur 
                                                                                                                     
 242. Agreement Between Friedman’s Inc. and the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
Eastern District of New York at 10 (Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Friedman’s, Inc. NPA], 
available at Garrett & Ashley, supra note 92, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/
prosecution_agreements/sites/default/files/pdf/friedmans.pdf. 
 243. Government’s proper interests exclude any conclusions of lack of guilt, which would 
require dropping the case, but include factors such as sufficiency of the evidence and likelihood 
of success at trial. See authorities cited supra note 79 (series of DOJ memos concerning charges 
against corporations and other business organizations). 
 244. See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the 
Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2007).  
 245. E.g., Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1974 (1992). 
 246. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507–09 (1984). 
 247. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)–(4). 
 248. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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Andersen. Second, in many cases, such as with AIG, DPAs are finalized 
after a firm’s prior leadership has been removed and the deal is signed 
by successors happy to cast blame on predecessors.  
Furthermore, were contract law to govern DPAs, some unusual 
provisions would likely produce results that would surprise participants. 
For example, absent express language disclaiming the creation of third 
party rights, it is possible that shareholders, competitors, customers, and 
other members of the public may have enforcement rights on corporate 
breach. That would be so if a court concluded that the government 
intended to give such persons the benefit of the corporation’s 
promises,249 which is plausible considering that prosecutors are charged 
with representing the interests of the public at large.250 If this were the 
case, it would represent an extraordinary alteration of corporate 
governance powers.251  
As another example, it is often up to the government’s discretion to 
declare corporate breach of a DPA, and the government’s remedy on 
breach is penal—an immediate suspension of the deferral and 
proceeding with a case, likely yielding indictment and conviction.252 
Such a deliberately and inherently penal remedy may pose tensions with 
the compensation principle of contract remedies, casting doubt on the 
validity of such a DPA under traditional contract law principles.253 
Accordingly, it may be difficult to both insist that DPAs are purely 
contractual and assume that they are enforceable as written.  
                                                                                                                     
 249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: INTENDED AND INCIDENTAL 
BENEFICIARIES § 302(1)(b). 
 250. Cf. Charles A. Sullivan, Enforcement of Government Antitrust Decrees by Private 
Parties: Third Party Beneficiary Rights and Intervenor Status, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 822, 868 
(1975); Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 
352–54 (1988). Third parties have participation rights in plea agreements under restitution and 
victims’ rights statutes, such as the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 
(2012). See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 917 n.12 (2006). 
 251. Cf. Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and 
Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 11–14 (2011). 
 252.  See Joe Warin, Brian Baldrate & Joe Spinelli, Resolving Corporate Investigations 
with Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements 26 (Sept. 16, 2011) 
(slide show presentation accompanying webcast). 
 253. Probation differs. Probation contracts, formed between a convicted offender and a 
judge, are made after a defendant is sentenced and consist of the suspension of that sentence so 
long as stated objective conditions are met. Failure to meet those conditions lifts the suspension 
and results in incarceration. See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & 
JUST. 149, 164–65 (1997). In DPAs, there has been no sentence (or conviction) that is merely 
being conditionally suspended. What’s being conditionally deferred is the indictment or 
prosecution and the combination of features that give rise to breach—often by unilateral 
government declaration—and remedy—a stipulation to given facts almost guaranteeing 
conviction—makes the result more consciously penal, even draconian, compared to probation 
contracts.  
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Yet, as a further mark of the limits of the pure contractual 
conception, when corporations allege breach of DPAs by prosecutors, 
courts do not automatically invoke contract principles to evaluate either 
the claim of breach or remedy. Rather, they defer to prosecutorial 
discretion over such basic matters as whether the government has 
surrendered contractual rights to pursue an indictment.254 But the status 
quo is most objectionable if DPAs are conceived to be pure regulation, 
rather than pure contract. 
2.  Pure Regulation? The Mirror-Image Critique 
DPAs are more akin to regulation than contract when one 
appreciates the massive imbalance of bargaining power that prosecutors 
wield over targets.255 Prosecutors have extraordinary state powers in the 
DPA setting, far different in magnitude and type from the concept of 
relative bargaining power contemplated in the realm of contract 
practice.256 It is not as if the corporation is negotiating a loan agreement 
or long-term lease with one of many lenders or landlords in the market. 
The corporation faces a government agent wielding monopoly power.257 
The DPA is a sword over the corporation’s head.258 DPAs have other 
regulatory qualities as well, including that violations expose the private 
party to public criminal law enforcement sanctions.259  
Ad Hoc Inferiority. Conceived as pure regulation, prosecutorial 
interventions are ad hoc solutions to systemic problems better addressed 
by legislation or administrative rulemaking ex ante rather than 
prosecutors ex post.260 Optimal deterrence is best achieved by inducing 
corporations to maintain effective internal policing by adopting ex ante 
duties that are generally applicable to companies rather than targeted to 
a particular one. Hence, general federal laws, such as the Organizational 
                                                                                                                     
 254. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied 
549 U.S. 1015 (2006); see infra text accompanying notes 266–271.  
 255. Expressed in terms of economic theory, contracts usually manifest an efficient 
bargain. Bargains between prosecutors and corporations memorialized in DPAs might be 
efficient also, to the extent that they reflect the features referenced in the preceding discussion of 
DPAs as pure contracts. Yet there may be circumstances in which contracts, including DPAs, 
are inefficient due to some form of “market failure.” Examples are massive imbalances in 
bargaining power or DPAs concluded by successor corporate officials eager to blame their 
predecessors.  
 256. Petersilia, supra note 253, at 164. 
 257. This is monopsony power if the government is seen as a buyer of admissions rather 
than the seller of deferral. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1472 n.1, 1473 n.2 (1993). 
 258. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
15 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1993). 
 259. Garrett, supra note 2, at 875; Rachel Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the 
Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2101 (2010). 
 260. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 107, at 16–18, 21–22 (developing this approach). 
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Sentencing Guidelines, encourage all companies to maintain effective 
compliance programs, and specific substantive regulations, such as 
addressing drug labeling or money laundering, establish industry-wide 
or generally applicable duties addressed to all companies.261 This value 
is particularly high when accompanied by an articulation of rationales, 
whether through legislative history, such as committee reports, or 
administrative agency statements, such as those publicized during the 
course of seeking notice and comment on proposed regulations.262 
Within such a regime, as a theoretical matter, there is little left for 
DPAs to do. At best, DPAs could contain terms tailored to matters over 
which such duty-based criminal liability and general regulation are 
somehow ineffective. This universe of problems is probably limited to 
terms that are designed to reduce the costs of managerial deviation from 
optimal policing. That is, the terms address problems particular firms 
have, such as when managers face private incentives to commit crimes. 
In the vocabulary of corporate law scholarship, these are collectively 
known as the agency costs of policing. As a procedural matter, laws and 
regulations made ex ante command legitimacy by concordance with 
norms of publication, open government, and access to law.263 
Narrow Scope. Under the conception of DPAs as pure regulation, it 
may be defensible for a prosecutor, on an ex post and firm-specific 
basis, to call for a particular company not only to maintain an effective 
compliance program against, for example, money laundering, but also 
to engage a special officer whose job is to assure that effectiveness.264 A 
DPA could likewise properly call for an independent monitor to oversee 
that person or anti-money-laundering process. An additional rule could 
require that such personnel be authorized to report directly to the 
corporation’s board chairman or to outside directors.265 
Such arrangements would be defensible attempts to reduce agency 
costs associated with internal policing—i.e., managerial incentives to 
avoid optimal compliance for personal gain. But, under the regulatory 
conception, prosecutors should be discouraged from proffering 
corporate governance terms that go beyond compliance. Delimiting 
DPA terms to those addressing agency costs of policing has some 
theoretical appeal and offers a way to curtail prosecutorial excesses. Yet 
                                                                                                                     
 261.  See id. at 4–5.  
 262. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 420, 476, 480 
(3d ed. 1999). 
 263. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, 
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 331 (2005) (“[A] powerful 
norm pulsing through the administrative lawmaking function requires publication of regulatory 
promulgations in the spirit of open government and public access to law.”). 
 264.  Arlen & Kahan, supra note 107, at 13–14. 
 265. The 2010 amendments to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines give targets credit 
for such a provision. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(3)(C) (2010). 
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given the contractual features of DPAs, this conception of DPAs as pure 
regulation is not entirely faithful to reality. 
3.  Prosecutorial Discretion: Most Faithful to Reality 
There is a fundamental problem with conceiving of DPAs as pure 
contracts, pure regulation, or even a hybrid. True, such conceptions may 
help evaluate the appeal of DPAs or assess their proper scope, but a 
more immediate question appears: the legality of a DPA, which is to say 
its enforceability in court. From the judicial perspective, 
conceptualizing DPAs as contracts or regulation may be trivial 
compared to conceptualizing them as products of prosecutorial 
discretion.  
Limited Judicial Review. Prosecutorial practice and venerated 
traditions of prosecutorial discretion put DPAs substantially beyond the 
scope of meaningful judicial review. An original rationale for DPAs is 
to enable handling probable criminal wrongdoing with limited formal 
public procedures, such as an indictment. True, upon declaration of 
breach by the government, the corporation may be able to obtain 
judicial review. But given the typical terms—government having power 
to declare breach and the remedy of proceeding immediately to 
prosecution on admitted facts—the corporation will face pressure 
unique to DPAs.  
Consider also the opposite case of a corporation’s declaration of 
prosecutorial breach.266 A corporation may declare breach and seek to 
enjoin the indictment on the basis that the prosecution sought to indict it 
despite a DPA and the corporation’s cooperation and compliance.267 But 
federal courts do not necessarily classify such cases as involving 
contracts or regulation, citing prosecutorial discretion.268  
As the Supreme Court has explained, prosecutorial discretion is 
entailed by constitutional separation of powers in which the “Executive 
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide 
whether to prosecute a case.”269 A longstanding feature of the 
separation-of-powers-based conception of prosecutorial discretion is 
that the judicial branch generally lacks jurisdiction to enjoin a criminal 
prosecution.270 Narrow exceptions to this jurisdictional limit concern 
enforcing government–defendant agreements, but even such agreements 
                                                                                                                     
 266. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied 
549 U.S. 1015 (2006).  
 267.  Id. at 181. 
 268. Technically, the agreement, with the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, was a leniency 
agreement, but the differences between such traditional tools of that Division and the more 
general class of DPAs is immaterial in this context. Id. at 179–80. 
 269. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). 
 270. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc). 
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are construed strictly in light of the constitutional separation of 
powers.271  
Many object to prosecutorial discretion, of course. Critics claim 
overreaching due to biased discrimination, political aspirations, 
excessive zeal, and, for DPAs, intrusion into the domain of corporate 
governance.272 Solutions include constraining prosecutorial discretion 
by greater delineation of substantive criminal law, legislative or judicial 
review of prosecutorial judgments, or, for DPAs, ruling governance off-
limits by statute or perhaps strengthening the role of grand juries in the 
process.273 For technical reasons, judicial review may nominally be 
required of DPAs upon execution,274 but no judge has ever rejected a 
DPA.275 Many do not even hold a hearing when asked to review 
them.276 A jurisdiction may require prosecutors who ultimately decide 
to drop a criminal case to file a written statement of reasons with a court 
for its approval.277  
Prosecutorial discretion has staunch defenders as well, and even its 
toughest critics acknowledge the necessity of some discretion.278 
Legislators and judges also seem to appreciate the necessity, as they 
have not interfered significantly with prosecutorial discretion. For 
DPAs, such interference would be of uncertain value. It would put 
judges, individuals with limited investigative resources and institutional 
competence, in the difficult position of second-guessing prosecutors 
who have conducted an investigation and engaged in negotiations with 
targets. Drawbacks also include adding a layer of costs. Another 
important indirect cost: sharing responsibility with the judicial branch 
                                                                                                                     
 271. For criticism of this stance, see Sarah Baumgartel, Nonprosecution Agreements as 
Contracts: Stolt-Nielsen and the Question of Remedy for a Prosecutor’s Breach, 2008 WIS. L 
REV. 25, 60–63.  
 272.  See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 
62 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-
Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBLEMS 77, 106–07 (2006). 
 273. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of 
the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 359–60 (2010) (discussing 
the oversight role played by grand juries). 
 274. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012) (allowing for deferral period to be excluded from 
counting time elapsed before trial if deferral agreement is judicially approved).  
 275. GARRETT, supra note 11, ch. 3 at 18, 37. 
 276. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 100, at 25 (finding that nine out of 
twelve judges interviewed did not conduct a hearing before approving DPAs). 
 277. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606 (2012); cf. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 
F.3d 158, 162 (2nd Cir. 2012) (criticizing district court judge Jed Rakoff’s assertion of power to 
upset settlement between regulatory agency and corporation). 
 278. See Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 369, 369 (2010). 
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does not stimulate prosecutors to prepare governance profiles ex post, 
an important objective of the integrated approach, the seminal lesson of 
Andersen, and a vital lesson of AIG. 
Prosecutorial discretion is a bulwark against excessive disclosure of 
matters better kept confidential. Obvious examples concern protecting 
victims or witnesses and maintaining the confidentiality of internal 
investigation and deliberation. Less obvious is how opacity can usefully 
obscure law enforcement resource constraints that can undermine 
deterrence. An excessively transparent process would reveal resource 
constraints that may have adverse effects on the public’s confidence in 
law enforcement or in its deterrent value. Relative opacity may offer 
other benefits, such as promoting public confidence in the fairness and 
efficiency of criminal law enforcement.279 When such concerns are not 
at stake or are outweighed by other factors, prosecutors make 
exceptions, such as declining to prosecute or giving reasons in 
individual cases.280 
Restraint. The solution is prosecutorial restraint, which evidence 
demonstrates can be highly effective.281 For example, evidence drawn 
from recently publicized records in several big-city prosecutors’ offices, 
such as New Orleans and Milwaukee, includes written statements of the 
reasons for their decisions, including decisions not to prosecute.282 The 
reasons given showed prosecutors making reliable judgments in 
accordance with the law. The brief statements of rationales lacked the 
completeness of judicial opinions but demonstrated a pattern of valid 
reasons at work, not abuses of discretion warranting judicial review or 
legislative constraint.283  
In the case of DPAs, a similar exercise, with public statements of the 
rationales, would be useful. After all, prosecutors occupy a special 
position as ambassadors for justice—quasi-judicial officers—and thus 
have some duty to look out for the interests of the target corporation and 
                                                                                                                     
 279. See Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 480 (2004). 
 280. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 292–94 (1980); John Eligon, Strauss-Kahn Drama Ends 
with Short Final Scene, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/nyregion/charg 
es-against-strauss-kahn-dismissed.html (referencing the twenty-five-page memo prosecutor 
Cyrus Vance released articulating reasons for declining to proceed with the prosecution of the 
French dignitary Strauss Kahn alleged to have committed sexual assault in the United States). 
The narrow exception for DPAs is warranted because this setting does not ordinarily implicate 
such broad-gauged problems and, when they might, confidential treatment can be provided 
accordingly.  
 281. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 149 
(2008) (explaining that prosecutors may focus efforts on certain crimes or offenses over others). 
 282. Id. at 130, 134, 163–66. 
 283.  See id. at 134–35, 183. 
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its constituencies.284 Important strands of the principle of prosecutorial 
neutrality direct prosecutors to act as objective public servants and to 
not represent partisan interests.285 Just as judicial supervision of 
unconscionable bargains invokes paternalistic impulses, prosecutors 
negotiating DPAs must protect the interests of their counterparties and 
must not act arbitrarily.286 
The integrated approach to DPAs is drawn narrowly to minimize 
infringement on prosecutorial discretion. The articulation practice 
addresses only governance terms in DPAs, not reasons for deferral, 
fines imposed, or admissions obtained. DPAs may be novel and 
controversial, but those should not necessarily be the tests warranting a 
call for public articulation. It is the uncharted territory and it is the 
damage that can be done to large organizations and related innocents 
that prompts this call.287  
No broader call for articulation is warranted. There are many 
contexts in which scholars have considered asking for public statements 
of prosecutorial decision-making.288 One example concerns 
prosecutorial decisions not to file charges—declinations akin to DPAs 
that some believe can amount to prosecutorial nullification.289 A public 
statement of reasons would address that concern but also prove 
burdensome, costly, and ultimately unwieldy.  
In short, the best way to conceptualize the DPA is not so much as a 
species of contract or regulation but as a product of prosecutorial 
discretion and to think about its proper scope and limits as such. So 
conceived, prudential prosecutorial restraint warrants the integrated 
approach of asking prosecutors to prepare a corporate governance 
profile ex ante as part of their investigation of corporate targets and then 
to publicly articulate the rationale for corporate governance terms in 
DPAs when they settle a case. Assuming such steps, prosecutors should 
feel free to proffer such terms, which would produce considerable net 
benefits, both systemic and parochial.  
                                                                                                                     
 284. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual 
Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 216 (1988). 
 285. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
837, 866. 
 286. Id. at 870–71. Far from returning the analysis to contract law, these observations 
underscore why conceiving of DPAs as products of prosecutorial discretion is more faithful to 
reality.  
 287. Another reason for this narrow focus is that these are the terms most likely to be 
improved by an articulation practice, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 290–297. 
 288.  See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1277 
(2011). 
 289. Id. at 1244. 
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B.  Comparative Benefits of the Integrated Approach 
This section probes the comparative benefits of the three conceptions 
analyzed in the previous section and shows the net superiority of the 
integrated approach. The integrated approach conceptualizes DPAs as 
products of prosecutorial discretion and calls for prosecutors to prepare 
a governance profile ex ante and to articulate rationales for governance 
terms ex post. The section first identifies advantages of the integrated 
approach over both the pure contract and the pure regulation 
conception. It also discusses the advantages that the integrated approach 
offers over the pure regulation conception alone and then the 
advantages it offers over the pure contract conception alone. (The 
ensuing section considers costs and other potential objections.)  
1.  Integrated Approach v. Pure Contract and Pure Regulation 
Conception 
Improved Decision-making. A practical problem with the pure 
regulation conception’s barring prosecutors from proffering governance 
reforms ex post is that it discourages prosecutors from considering 
governance ex ante. The pure contract conception creates the same 
disincentive for a different reason, signaling to prosecutors that there is 
no need to give governance terms any more thought than is given to any 
term in any ordinary contract. A primary advantage of the integrated 
approach is that it would lead prosecutors to invest in understanding a 
target’s governance profile, which would improve the quality of 
prosecutors’ analysis ex ante and ex post.  
In the integrated approach, all the varied aspects of corporate 
governance, referenced above in Part I, would be potentially probative. 
Prosecutors would include the creation of a basic profile as part of the 
initial investigative phase of a case. The profile would provide a basis 
on which to negotiate DPAs and would be updated throughout the 
investigation. Such knowledge likely would imply different signals to 
prosecutors about how to proceed, i.e., whether to indict or settle. In 
some cases, that would lead to eschewing the DPA in favor of 
proceeding with an indictment and perhaps trial and conviction. In cases 
where settlement is indicated, the ex ante profile would inform 
prosecutorial judgment about appropriate changes. 
Tailoring. A related advantage of the integrated approach is the 
opportunity to fix specific problems within a company. After all, 
governance terms operate differently at different companies, and the 
formal uniformity of typical regulatory conceptions obscures those 
different operations.290 DPAs can supply custom-tailored terms that ex 
ante legislation and administrative rulemaking cannot.  
                                                                                                                     
 290. See supra text accompanying notes 56–59. 
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The practice of articulation, moreover, would improve the fit of 
tailored terms to given firms. Providing written reasons for decisions 
tends to improve the quality of decision-making, in most settings.291 
This is one of several values underlying the widespread practice in the 
United States of judicial opinion writing and regulatory statements 
accompanying proposed rulemaking by administrative agencies.292 The 
legal community agrees that such writing improves reasoning, 
especially concerning legal decision-making.293 Prosecutors do not 
routinely give reasons for their decisions, but current research indicates 
that prosecutors believe that articulation of reasons benefits their 
decision-making too.294  
Evidence from psychological research largely affirms such beliefs.295 
A written rationale sharpens the reasoning, which improves decision-
making. It appears to be most effective for decisions that involve factors 
that are relatively finite, causal, logical, precise, and technical296—the 
characteristics of corporate governance terms. Not all decisions require 
a written rationale, of course, and there is no imperative to explain the 
obvious or to reach for reasons when a decision is reasonably made on 
the basis of hunch or intuition. In such situations, research suggests 
writing exercises can actually be counterproductive.297 For DPAs, the 
decision to defer and the fines set may be respected as products of 
hunch and intuition, whereas the choice of particular substantive 
governance terms calls for reason. The articulation practice should thus 
improve the tailoring of fit between terms and targets.  
Generality. A third factor affecting the relative appeal of conceiving 
of DPAs as contractual, regulatory, or discretionary concerns how each 
conception deals with prosecutors’ offices, which vary greatly across 
the United States.298 For instance, institutional differences distinguish 
federal district offices from state and local offices: many state attorneys 
                                                                                                                     
 291. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1286 (2008).  
 292. See id.; Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, 
Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1845 (2012).  
 293. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 654 (1995). 
 294. E-mail from Ronald Wright, Needham Yancy Gulley Professor of Criminal Law, 
Wake Forest Univ. Sch. of Law, to Lawrence A. Cunningham (Oct. 12, 2012) (on file with 
author) (referencing interviews with some 200 prosecutors conducted over a recent two-year 
period as part of a qualitative project that reflects such beliefs). 
 295. Oldfather, supra note 291, at 1322.  
 296. Id. at 1286–87, 1321–22. 
 297. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 37 (2007); Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on 
Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 234 (1990). 
 298. E.g., MICHAEL L. BENSON & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME: 
LOCAL PROSECUTORS AT WORK 46–48 (1998); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in 
Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137, 149–50 (2006). 
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general have more autonomy than their federal counterparts and many 
local prosecutors are elected rather than appointed.299 Caseloads differ, 
with the Southern District of New York handling more corporate 
matters than the Southern District of Texas, for example. The relative 
efficacy of ex ante regulation or ex post judicial or legislative review 
may diverge across settings.  
All such factors are potentially relevant to defending a conception of 
DPAs as either contracts or regulation but, more importantly, would be 
relevant to assessing the validity of given DPA terms as a matter of 
contract or of regulation. Relative bargaining power would influence 
whether a DPA is best conceived as contract but also whether it is the 
reasonable product of volition rather than an unconscionable result of 
duress. The efficacy of ex ante regulation—say for local law regulating 
taxi fleets or liquor sales—would be relevant to evaluating the validity 
of a DPA term requiring a corporation to create a chief public safety 
officer. The relevance of such factors dissolves when DPAs are 
appreciated as species of prosecutorial discretion as each prosecutors’ 
office exercises discretion in accordance with its unique features and 
completes the requested investigation and explanation accordingly.300  
2.  Integrated Approach v. Pure Regulation Conception 
Line Drawing. Compared to the pure regulation conception, an 
advantage of the integrated approach is that it overcomes line drawing 
problems. Under the conception of DPAs as pure regulation, legislators 
or prosecutors would have to distinguish between compliance terms 
deemed proper, and governance terms ruled out-of-bounds. Compliance 
is a subset of corporate governance, but particular devices may evade 
ready classification. Consider a provision appointing a chief compliance 
officer who reports directly to the board, a term composed of both 
compliance and governance attributes. More broadly, consider the 
example of disclosure, which DPAs invariably require corporations to 
make. Disclosure is an important topic of corporate governance but may 
be an equally important topic of corporate compliance. Under the 
integrated approach, no line drawing is required.301  
                                                                                                                     
 299.  Bibas, supra note 298, at 143. 
 300. Other differences that dissolve include the extent to which prosecutors coordinate with 
regulatory authorities on any given case. While relevant to evaluations of DPAs as contracts or 
regulation, this simply becomes an element of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion when 
DPAs are conceived as such. Cf. Garrett, supra note 2, at 936–37. 
 301. One approach to such line-drawing challenges would classify all hybrid devices as 
compliance and condone their inclusion in DPAs. Indeed, the class of compliance devices could 
simply be enlarged to admit any device that has more than a remote potential contribution to 
compliance. Defined thus broadly, many terms that might routinely be thought of as governance 
devices would be ruled in. Examples of terms that could be fairly deemed compliance rather 
than governance include the removal and replacement of officers, the expansion of a corporate 
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Scope of Purposes. Another advantage of the integrated approach 
compared to the pure regulation conception concerns the purposes of 
DPAs. The conception of DPAs as pure regulation not only puts 
governance terms off-limits, but also tests the validity of compliance 
terms based on their deterrence value by hypothesizing employee 
calculations concerning whether to comply with the law.302 But this 
approach ignores the recognized school of thought that people comply 
with the law due to norms of obedience that arise from features of a 
system that give it legitimacy.303 Many governance mechanisms fit the 
bill, not merely technical compliance devices.304 Prosecutors speak of 
achieving rehabilitation aims, such as changing corporate culture from 
one of corruption to one that embraces compliance. Governance devices 
may serve such goals.305  
Better Regulation. Under the pure regulation conception, ex ante 
legislation and administrative rulemaking are preferred to ex post 
tailoring. Yet one widely recognized problem with general regulation 
that occurs following financial crises is the risk of overreaction amid 
widespread psychological and political pressure.306 True, after scandal, 
populist backlash against those perceived to have caused problems can 
increase the risk of exuberant prosecutorial enforcement.307 But such 
pressures appear less problematic in given DPAs with a particular 
company. One reason may be the direct bargaining that occurs between 
prosecutors and corporations in the DPA setting compared to the bustle 
of national politics, in which lobbyists battle each other. In any event, 
the prescribed articulation practice would curb excesses.  
Innovative, tailored terms that are explained when adopted could 
also prove to have value that could be fruitfully adapted to other 
companies or even provide the basis for broadly applicable law or rule. 
Experimentation accompanied by explanation would likely improve the 
development of tools that promote deterrence and compliance.  
                                                                                                                     
board and populating it with new outside directors, designation of new committees addressing 
compliance as well as risk, legal affairs, or even auditing, environmental matters and so on. 
There is nothing inherent about many terms that warrant objecting to their inclusion per se. Each 
term should be taken on its own and evaluated for its role in the given corporation. Judgments 
made contextually are likely superior to rules stated abstractly. 
 302. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 200 (1968). 
 303. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (2006). 
 304. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of 
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1284–85 (1998); Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing 
and Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal, 
77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 546 (2008). 
 305. See Henning, supra note 11, at 1420. 
 306. See Romano, supra note 58, at 1563. 
 307. See Baer, supra note 3, at 625–26.  
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3.  Integrated Approach v. Status Quo 
The chief advantages of the integrated approach compared to the 
status quo concern the prospect of formalizing, systematizing, and 
cataloguing what has emerged as a spontaneous and opaque set of 
practices. DPA practice also appears to be haphazard, although there is 
evidence that senior lawyers at the DOJ are attempting to systematize 
it.308 Their effort supports the view that the status quo could use 
improvement. Advantages arise from the proposed practice of public 
articulation of the rationales for governance terms included in DPAs. 
Aside from how they may improve the quality of decision-making as 
noted earlier, such written rationales are valuable as precedent and as a 
source of legitimacy. 
Precedent. Precedent is valuable as a resource to guide resolution of 
future cases in accordance with similar previous cases.309 The 
articulation practice would provide a record of the thought process 
prosecutors and counterparties followed when agreeing on governance 
terms. Such a system would contribute a base of knowledge on which 
prosecutors and corporations could draw in future cases, generating 
fairness gains akin to those of stare decisis, and efficiency gains by 
reducing the costs of negotiation and settlement and increasing the 
quality of tailoring terms to particular settings.  
Legitimacy. Legitimacy, a complex multifaceted concept, 
encompasses the notion of justifications for legal decisions.310 
Publicizing such justifications increases the value of legal 
justification.311 Otherwise, participants and the public may be mystified, 
confused, and unable to evaluate the decision fairly. One rationale for 
published articulation as a source of legitimacy is the reasoned 
elaboration provided, which demonstrates that a decision is based upon 
more than fiat, office, or position, but upon principle with a claim to 
independent respect.312  
Derivative values include creating the capacity for outsiders to 
assess the reasoning and its fidelity to prevailing standards and related 
values such as stare decisis. True, few writings can provide a 
comprehensive and faithful account of all reasons, as few judicial 
opinions do, yet the exercise constrains discretion to concord with the 
                                                                                                                     
 308. See GARRETT, supra note 11. 
 309. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 70–72 (1981); Frederick Schauer, 
Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571 (1987). 
 310. See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2008). 
 311. Id. at 1005. 
 312. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 378 
(1978); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism 
and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 285–86 (1973). 
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criterion of legitimacy.313 Such ability adds the value of perceived 
legitimacy, as the public can more confidently accept the judgments of 
those who explain themselves under the valence of neutrality than those 
who act by fiat or demand to be trusted with power. 
The value in the context of DPAs with business organizations seems 
even more likely to be pronounced. An authoritative statement of why 
governance changes are being made would benefit all corporate 
constituents, including directors, officers, employees, gatekeepers, and 
shareholders. In corporate settings where internal communications are 
part of the governance apparatus, it may seem odd to employees that 
such results are not explained by authorities. The authoritative statement 
of rationales would communicate institutional resolve, often necessary 
to induce employees company-wide to take governance and compliance 
measures seriously. 
Critique. DPAs produced without explanation expose participants to 
criticism when the rationale for particular terms is unclear and open to 
competing interpretations. Many governance terms often seem jarring to 
corporate lawyers and other observers. If explained in context, however, 
the terms might be better understood.314 No doubt, they may seem 
jarring to employees and others within the organization with whom they 
directly deal. With articulations, critics would challenge the stated 
rationale of a term rather than the unadorned term as it appears on the 
face of a contract. Whatever the reaction, observers would have a firmer 
foundation to provide criticism or praise when reviewing DPAs.  
Prosecutorial Error and Overreach. Current practice leaves no 
reliable record of reasoning, one of the important functions of offering 
public justifications.315 The AIG case study is a good example, where 
despite investigation through interviews and primary sources, it is 
difficult to be certain exactly why certain steps were taken or even when 
or by whom.316 A record from participants would have been intrinsically 
valuable and checked the risk of prosecutorial error—a product of the 
improved decision-making that articulations offer—and overreach—a 
product of their legitimation function. Had Spitzer been compelled to 
understand AIG’s governance at the outset and explain why the 
proffered terms made sense for AIG, the risk of oversight and 
inattention would have been diminished.  
Such an effect would likewise check the risk of prosecutorial 
                                                                                                                     
 313. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an Iterative Process: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 781 (2006). 
 314. Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative 
Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 412 (1978). 
 315. See James Boyd White, What’s An Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1368–69 
(1995). 
 316. See supra note 126. 
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overreach. Prosecutors may be motivated to settle a case using a DPA 
for a variety of reasons.317 These can be arrayed along a continuum 
relating motive to the merits or relative legitimacy. At one end would be 
the clearly legitimate avoidance of risks of adverse collateral 
consequences or organizational indictment, mitigating concerns over the 
uncertainty of trial, and achieving efficient case closure. Toward the 
other end are objectives such as bragging rights, which may or may not 
promote such valid goals as deterrence and, perhaps at the very end, 
advancing political objectives such as running for higher office. 
Whatever the motivations, however, the integrated approach 
(investigation and articulation) should channel them toward the 
“legitimate” end of the continuum. 
Prosecutorial Gains. A special appeal to the interests of prosecutors 
should not be ignored. Gains to prosecutors from the articulation 
practice arise from the overall program of building a body of valuable 
knowledge. These benefits are akin to those judges derive from the 
practice of opinion writing and regulators derive from drafting releases 
for public comment, which share many of the same objectives—
precedent, stare decisis, efficiency, legitimacy, neutrality, and 
transparency. Such exercises help to expand their authors’ power, 
especially among branches of government.318 Likewise, leadership 
positions and reputations can be made by publishing outstanding 
accounts of decisions.319  
Transparency. Many of the foregoing advantages are particular 
examples of the broader feature of transparency that articulation 
practice would provide. Transparency is valuable for public 
acceptability. The public is more likely to accept the practice of legal 
settlements between government and corporate defendants when the 
related terms, including underlying reasons, are explained. 
Transparency carries downsides—a cost to those who would prefer to 
operate behind closed doors. Some prosecutors, and perhaps many 
defense lawyers, may prefer a more opaque process. There can be valid 
reasons for such a preference, such as protecting proprietary business 
matters or witnesses’ identities.320 Prosecutorial discretion should be 
maintained for these purposes, while preserving the other benefits of 
transparency.  
                                                                                                                     
 317. See supra text accompanying note 102. 
 318. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for 
Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44–45 (1993). 
 319. See David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 373–74 (1999). 
 320. See supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Costs and Other Potential Objections 
Direct Costs. Few proposals for change are without costs, and there 
are certainly costs associated with the integrated approach. The costs, 
however, should be reasonably low and are offset by the substantial 
gains from error reduction ex ante and improved effectiveness ex post. 
As a frame of reference, federal regulations call for the DOJ to conduct 
a cost–benefit analysis of any proposal that would likely have an annual 
impact on the economy of $100 million or more.321 It does not seem 
likely that this proposal would entail such high incremental costs.322 
Nevertheless, a rough cost summary is worth sketching and should then 
be compared to the benefits hypothesized in the previous section.  
The prescribed corporate investigation would require dispatching an 
additional team of prosecutors or investigators to conduct a governance 
profile ex ante, and this may require engaging the assistance of outside 
experts at some cost.323 Some of the associated fixed costs, however, are 
already incurred in current practice. The investigation involves 
reviewing documents and interviewing executives, employees, and 
sometimes third parties. The specific search for and extraction of 
information on corporate practices and structures, as well as related 
analysis, would add incremental costs. But preparing a useful profile of 
even a relatively large company should be possible with 100 to 300 
hours of effort—the AIG profile summarized in Part II took far less 
time. Charged at a rate of up to $500 per hour, that yields approximate 
costs of no more than $150,000. 
During the settlement process, the incremental costs of articulation 
are more modest. Under current practice, prosecutors do much of the 
required work concerning articulation. At the DPA drafting stage, 
                                                                                                                     
 321. See Exec. Order No. 12866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993); OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS at 32 (2003).  
 322. As an imperfect proxy, the average annual number of DOJ DPAs in the past decade is 
less than forty. To have an impact of at least $100 million would mean that incremental costs 
per case equal or exceed $2.5 million. Chief incremental costs per investigation and DPA are 
up-front investigation efforts and ex post articulation practices. As explained below, the 
additional costs of investigation are unlikely to exceed $150,000 and the additional costs of 
settlement unlikely to exceed $50,000. True, the total costs would be greater by virtue of ex ante 
investigations that may not lead to DPAs but even that added cost is unlikely to result in costs 
exceeding $100 million annually.  
 323. This exercise would be part of the preliminary investigation and consist of assembling 
a corporate governance profile, akin to that business lawyers might provide ahead of a corporate 
acquisition, see JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 420 (1975), or underwriters might 
use to quote premiums for directors’ and officers’ insurance, see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, 
The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1795, 1813 (2007). Much of the content for public companies would be publicly 
available; non-public details could be readily obtained by prosecutors exercising standard 
investigative powers, including the subpoena power. 
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prosecutors submit work for higher level approval that would include 
memoranda explaining the basis for the agreement and 
recommendation. Such a practice assures that prosecutors operate 
within the agenda of their offices. It does entail additional work but, as 
the examples in the next Part will show, the envisioned articulation 
exercise is not overwhelming.324 In an analogous context, private 
plaintiffs’ lawyers settling derivative shareholder lawsuits based on 
governance reforms rather than money damages obtain independent 
legal opinions that the reforms confer substantial benefits—an exercise 
in which law professors are often engaged at a total cost rarely 
exceeding $50,000.325  
When weighing costs and benefits, one objection may be that the 
frequency of governance terms proffered for DPAs is low compared to 
the number of investigations opened, as many investigations close, 
proceed through prosecution, or are resolved using DPAs that do not 
include governance terms. If so, it might follow that costs of ex ante 
investigation would arguably be wasted, warranting prosecutors to defer 
developing requisite rationales until the DPA stage when it is known 
that governance terms are to be negotiated. The proposed integrated 
approach to investigation and reform, however, includes a prominent 
role for the investigation stage, independent of the governance terms in 
DPAs. The Andersen case makes clear the importance of considering 
governance features at the outset, without regard to whether the topic 
ever arises in a DPA. The AIG case reinforces that lesson, as 
prosecutors should have proceeded with greater caution amid the 
company’s ongoing governance debate over executive succession. 
A final point about the proposed integrated approach is that 
incremental costs should not be so great as to dissuade prosecutors from 
pursuing DPAs in cases where that is judged to be the best outcome. 
After all, DPAs are currently cheap for prosecutors, and the proposed 
integrated approach would increase their cost. Costs must not be 
increased so much that DPAs are abandoned in favor of inferior 
choices, such as the blunt and risky course of indictment. The concern 
should be modest, however, as the increased incremental costs, even if 
high at the outset, should decline over time as knowledge is developed, 
precedents built, and procedures standardized. In any event, the effects 
of the switch might marginally reduce the number of DPAs over the 
short term, but their quality would increase with time as well.  
                                                                                                                     
 324. One sample is the law review article that prosecutors published after executing a DPA 
with Bristol-Myers Squibb, in which they explained their rationale for many of the governance 
provisions and other terms. See generally Christie & Hanna, supra note 7; infra apps. A and B. 
 325. Such opinions, which are publicly available, have been provided by such corporate 
law professors as Jesse Fried (Harvard), Jeffrey Gordon (Columbia), Sean Griffith (Fordham) 
and Donald Langevoort (Georgetown).  
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Expertise or Competence. A second objection to the integrated 
approach concerns prosecutorial expertise or competence. Many 
prosecutors lack training in corporate governance, and some lack 
interest. Skeptics might thus wonder about the feasibility of calling for 
prosecutors to learn corporate governance, particularly of a large 
organization. This is a good objection to the status quo (featuring 
governance reforms without evident governance knowledge) but a weak 
point against the integrated approach. Again, walling off prosecutors 
from governance would discourage them from considering important 
facts ex ante. Further, while such a learning curve may be steep, it is 
climbable. The call, after all, is not so much about broad vague 
intangible notions of corporate culture but about particular governance 
attributes that contribute to defining it and then (a) what their presence 
says about the probable and desirable results of steps a prosecutor may 
consider and (b) what should be changed about them as a condition of 
settling a case.326  
Even so, at the DPA negotiation stage, a target board and 
management likely have greater expertise and knowledge than 
prosecutors concerning governance terms generally and how they might 
work at their company.327 Prosecutors should recognize that and 
proceed with a degree of deference, though they do not always appear to 
do so. The articulation practice would improve the dialogue and the 
sense of shared good faith each side brings to the goal of improving 
governance. Care is particularly important when settlements are 
negotiated with corporate officials after predecessors have been 
removed and replaced, as in the case of AIG. Perverse incentives may 
lead the succeeding personnel to amplify concerns in a bid to cast all 
blame on outgoing executives.328 
In the end, corporate governance is not more sophisticated or 
inaccessible than any other peculiar subject with which prosecutors 
must familiarize themselves. It is broader than compliance, but even 
compliance requires expertise that many prosecutors will not 
automatically have before a case in which it becomes necessary. 
Prosecutorial resources will increase in time, moreover, as prosecutors 
develop accessible precedents as reservoirs of knowledge. For those 
prosecutors unwilling or unable to learn what is required, they can enlist 
the aid of experts from among current or former securities regulators, 
corporate law or business professors, and the like. Experts must still 
exercise caution, of course, as they are not immune from mistakes. The 
                                                                                                                     
 326. Further, the DOJ is seeking to systematize and coordinate internal knowledge and 
expertise concerning governance in DPAs. See supra text accompanying note 308. The DOJ 
also increasingly seeks to coordinate with relevant agencies. See supra note 91. 
 327.  See Christie & Hanna, supra note 7, at 1051. 
 328. See supra note 255. 
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AIG case attests to this: a former chairman of the SEC prescribed off-
the-rack reforms that backfired due to improper evaluation of the 
company’s corporate governance profile.329  
Temperament. A variation on the objection about competence or 
expertise concerns institutional and personal disposition. Prosecutors 
may tend to adopt an adversarial outlook due to their interest in—and 
institutional direction toward—punishment, usually via convictions and 
fines. The integrated approach differs, as it embraces a more 
cooperative transactional-bargaining and creative problem-solving 
approach. Even were chief prosecutors to require such exercises, some 
prosecutors may not be particularly good at them. On the other hand, 
the DPA setting marks at least an incremental retreat from the 
courtroom to the boardroom and thus a shift in outlook from hostility to 
settlement. Prosecutors inclined to carry such adversarial traits into the 
bargaining process are better advised to enlist the leadership of 
prosecutorial colleagues more disposed to the transactional approach to 
settlement.330 It is akin to the shift other disputatious types must 
undergo when opting for other forms of alternative dispute resolution.331  
Potency. Even assuming prosecutors embraced the profile exercise 
and produced the articulations, there is no way to know how useful the 
articulations would be. The product relies upon highly intangible 
incentives and there is no formal scrutiny. Formal scrutiny could be 
supplied by judges, but that solution, while potentially adding 
discipline, would also inflate costs and increase risks of error due to 
oversight by an individual who may lack expertise and institutional 
resources. 
Furthermore, though intangible, prosecutors have their reputations at 
stake in the articulation exercise.332 That may provide a more serious 
constraint than judicial review, as it exposes prosecutors to the 
judgment of their peers and other professional and public audiences.333 
In addition, these documents would likely be drafted not solely by 
prosecutors, but with considerable input from defense counsel, resulting 
in a more meaningful and comprehensive product.334  
                                                                                                                     
 329. See supra Section II.C. 
 330. See William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 367, 369 (1999). 
 331. See Gary Mendelsohn, Note, Lawyers as Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 139, 
145 (1996). 
 332.  See Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 173, 176 (2008). 
 333. See id. at 208. 
 334. The practice of articulating rationales would have effects on the bargaining process as 
well. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 795, 800 (2004). Exploration of such phenomena and their implications are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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There is some risk that such follow-the-leader practices could simply 
produce a boilerplate product, but boilerplate is often a sign of optimal 
contracting.335 Degenerative repetition would produce thoughtless 
boilerplate with prosecutors simply going through the motions, copying 
the last DPA memo released. If that were to occur, there would be little 
lost costs along the way. It is a typical risk of failure, not an objection 
that should prevent embracing the proposal.  
Window Dressing. A final potential objection is that prosecutorial 
focus on governance will simply lead corporations to adopt best 
practices in name only, akin to how companies go through the motions 
of compliance without promoting legal obedience in fact.336 When 
corporations know that prosecutors focus on compliance when 
evaluating how to proceed with a case and settle it, a propensity toward 
compliance window dressing arises.337 The same concern is less likely 
valid concerning governance reforms.  
Ex ante prosecutorial examination of governance features 
encompasses such intangibles as the tone at the top and power 
allocations among officers, directors, employees, and shareholders. 
Such features, unlike many compliance programs, are difficult to fake. 
The creation and maintenance of an employee stock ownership plan, for 
example, directly affects an important aspect of governance, yet 
managers are unlikely to be able to manipulate it solely for cosmetic 
purposes. Nor can managers as readily manipulate such factors as the 
concentration of institutional shareholder ownership, ownership by 
insiders, or employee culture.  
On the other hand, prosecutors must avoid the best practices trap that 
wreaked havoc in the AIG case. Another example of the problem, which 
befell the most devoted governance watchers, is how Enron’s board was 
named among the best in America338 just months before Enron was 
exposed to be a cipher. 
IV.  SPECIFIC TERMS AND BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB 
This Part considers examples of specific governance terms that have 
appeared or may appear in DPAs. It draws examples from numerous 
DPAs, including several from the controversial Bristol-Myers Squibb 
DPA.339 The Appendices contain excerpts of selected governance terms 
                                                                                                                     
 335. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821, 825 (2006) (“Boilerplate”: 
Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium). 
 336. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 337. See id. 
 338. Robert W. Lear, Boards on Trial, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Oct. 31, 2000, available at 2000 
WLNR 4391614. 
 339. See generally Christie & Hanna, supra note 7 (exploring prosecutorial discretion in 
the context of the Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA). 
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from the Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA followed by prosecutorial 
explanations of those terms. The point is to illustrate the feasibility of 
this Article’s prescription and some of the immediate benefits apparent 
from the exercise. It also suggests the value that might arise from the 
production of libraries or catalogues of similar articulations. This Part 
also considers objections to specific terms’ inclusion in DPAs as well as 
reasoning to justify such inclusion.340 These justifications illustrate the 
rationales that prosecutors should publicly provide when including these 
terms in DPAs. 
A.  Officers and Directors 
DPAs commonly call for the termination of employment of 
particular individuals, often officers alleged to have been involved in 
wrongdoing. The AIG case study provided the ultimate example of such 
an effort, targeting a CEO. Though common, the DPAs and 
accompanying press releases usually reveal little about the rationale of 
these changes. Critics oppose allowing DPAs to require such 
terminations.341 After all, officers are appointed by directors, and that 
appointment is among the most important jobs a board performs. It is 
considered an inviolate mandate as seen in criticism of Spitzer for 
overtly engineering the ouster of the CEO at Marsh & McLennan342 and 
for the more covert effort at AIG.  
As a legal matter, such ouster would be objectionable when a 
prosecutor has not made a good faith study of the claims being lodged. 
To justify an ouster, prosecutors also should be willing to explain their 
actions from a corporate governance perspective. Prosecutors must base 
such judgments on an investigation. Probable cause is a concept of 
criminal procedure relevant to an ex ante determination about whether 
to proceed. It is not the standard for corporate governance ouster, which 
is a business judgment that must be based on reliable information, not 
ex ante probabilities.343  
Many DPAs also prescribe specific structural or organizational 
attributes for certain officer positions, a topic of corporate governance 
                                                                                                                     
 340. Discussion speaks in terms of the corporate form but should be applicable generally to 
other forms of business organization. It is an illustrative survey rather than an exhaustive 
inventory, as the subject of corporate governance is vast. It also addresses only cognizable 
terms, omitting those that cannot be altered by an agreement as a practical matter, such as 
concerning shareholder demographics, as well as those that are restricted for other legal reasons, 
such as upsetting settled and reasonable employee expectations concerning indemnification or 
advancement of expenses to those facing legal claims. Cf. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 
146 (2d Cir. 2008) (endorsing employee objection, on constitutional grounds, to prosecutorial 
insistence that the corporation refuse to cover employees’ legal defense expenses).  
 341. E.g., Arlen & Kahan, supra note 107, at 25. 
 342. See supra text accompanying notes 168–170. 
 343. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
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usually left up to boards. Most commonly, DPAs require the 
appointment of particular officers, such as chief compliance officers or 
chief risk officers. Some DPAs direct particular reporting protocols, 
such as that the officer must report directly to the board and not the 
CEO or other management. Prosecutors may seek to separate the 
identity of the CEO and chairman. (All these were included in the AIG 
prosecution.)344 
Any of these terms may have a defensible logic in the context of a 
given company’s overall corporate governance attributes. It ought to be 
permissible for prosecutors to negotiate for them or even impose them, 
so long as they have demonstrated an understanding of those attributes 
and articulated a rationale for the terms. For example, at Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, prosecutors requested that the chairman and CEO positions be 
split.345 Although the rationale was not articulated as part of the 
agreement when executed, the prosecutors subsequently published a law 
review article in which they offered an explanation.346 It may not be as 
detailed as one would hope, but it reassuringly demonstrates awareness 
of important issues and a struggle with balancing trade-offs within the 
company:  
[The traditional structure of having the top leader hold both 
positions] has its own benefits and risks: a strong 
chair/CEO is quite likely a more efficient structure than 
splitting those jobs, yet it provides fewer checks and 
balances. . . . [It can be valuable to] have an active, 
experienced non-executive chairman act as an effective 
check on the CEO; and to insure that the CEO’s office 
would not act as a bottleneck for information between the 
corporate officers and the board of directors. We believed 
this change would enhance the openness and effectiveness 
of the governance of Bristol-Myers [Squibb]. Eventually, 
management agreed with our assessment.347  
This discussion might have offered additional specific reasons to 
believe why splitting the roles would be effective at Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, both in terms of compliance and performance. Such 
explanations should accompany the DPA, not be published afterwards. 
Despite such shortcomings, articulating rationales is unusual, attractive, 
and worthy of emulation.  
The board of directors is at the core of corporate governance, 
entailing many attributes such as size, qualification, term of office, use 
                                                                                                                     
 344.  See infra app. A. 
 345.  Christie & Hanna, supra note 7, at 1052. 
 346. Id. at 1052–53. 
 347. Id. at 1051–52. 
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of committees, and executive sessions. Skeptics would oppose terms in 
any of these quintessential topics of corporate governance, though many 
DPAs contain such intrusions. For example, several have required the 
board to add one or more outside directors.348 In at least one case, the 
agreement provided for the reinstatement of a particular individual.349 
At AIG, numerous outside directors were also added, in part by 
prosecutorial instigation.  
Some might object that it is unlikely that adding any given number 
of directors or filling the slots with one or more additional outside 
directors would add deterrence or have any bearing on a corporation’s 
propensity toward compliance with the law.350 But such sweeping 
generalities are hard to defend. It is possible that the manager–directors 
on a given board have outsized influence to emphasize risk-taking and 
err too often on the side of legal violations and that, had there been just 
one more outside voice objecting to such a view, a different atmosphere 
or culture could develop.  
In principle, it is even possible that an agreement between a 
prosecutor and corporation on the designation of a particular person is 
defensible.351 That is especially logical in the case of a term calling for 
the reinstatement of a particular individual, as experience provides 
observable evidence of probable effectiveness. Of course, one should 
not have to take it on faith that such terms are ipso facto legitimate. But 
prosecutors should be entitled to agree to such terms, provided they 
have considered governance realities and explained in written rationales 
accompanying the DPAs the basis for including them.  
DPAs may call for the creation of particular committees and their 
various attributes. Notably, neither federal nor state law requires any 
corporate board to have committees.352 The closest to a mandatory 
                                                                                                                     
 348. Order for Continuance, Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. Bristol-
Myers Squibb, No. 2:05-mj-06076 (D.N.J. June 15, 2005), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Bristol-
Myers Squibb DPA], available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/bristol-meyers.pdf (requiring the addition of one outside director); 
Friedman’s, Inc. NPA, supra note 242, at 10 (mandating the firm maintain the number of 
independent directors required by NYSE).  
 349. ABB Vetco Gray (Feb. 2007) (reappointment of a new executive chair to the board).  
 350. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 107, at 27. 
 351. Critics fairly object to the naming of particular people or organizations in DPAs on the 
grounds that doing so may create the appearance of cronyism. At minimum, it seems desirable 
for prosecutors to refrain from dictating any particular donation or naming any given person to 
assume any role. If such terms are deemed desirable in good faith based on an assessment of 
corporate governance realities, then prosecutors should repose discretion over the particulars to 
the company rather than specify a particular person or organization. To reduce doubt, 
prosecutors might forbid naming any persons or institutions with which anyone in the 
prosecutor’s office is associated. A credible middle ground might allow for the corporation to 
choose from a list that the prosecutor pre-approves.  
 352. State statutes invariably permit but do not require board committees. E.g., DEL. CODE 
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committee arises from Sarbanes-Oxley which sets stringent 
requirements for any audit committee that exists and then provides that 
the stringent requirements apply to the whole board if there is no 
separate audit committee.353 A similar effect arises from the Dodd-
Frank Act to produce compensation committees.354 Governance 
devotees and institutional shareholders also often seek or endorse the 
creation of other committees at particular companies, including 
governance and nomination committees.  
Some DPAs have followed suit.355 A good example is the NPA with 
Gen Re, the Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary at the origin of the AIG 
case, which required an officer of Berkshire Hathaway to attend Gen 
Re’s audit committee meetings.356 There may be a credible rationale for 
this: thanks largely to Warren Buffett, Berkshire exudes corporate 
integrity.357 It had recently acquired Gen Re and found that there was a 
gap between Berkshire’s traditionally tight internal control environment 
and looser practices at Gen Re.358 This is a quintessential governance 
issue—in terms of the implicit knowledge of both the need and the 
remedy—but with a coherent rationale. The principal defect is that the 
prosecutor failed to publicly articulate that rationale.  
B.  Charitable Giving 
Corporate charitable giving is a feature of corporate governance that 
prosecutors sometimes use when forming DPAs.359 Terms usually 
                                                                                                                     
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2010). 
 353. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301(2), 116 Stat. 745, 776. 
 354. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
sec. 952(a), § 10C, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010). 
 355. E.g., Friedman’s, Inc. NPA, supra note 242, at 11–12 (requiring firm to create audit, 
nomination and compensation committees); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, para. 12(b)–(c), 
United States v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. (Sept. 22, 2004) (on file with author) (requiring 
committees and an extensive array of other governance changes). 
 356. Letter from Paul E. Pelletier, Acting Chief, & Adam G. Safwat, Assistant Chief, Fraud 
Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Ronald L. Olson, Outside Counsel, General Re Corp. 5 (Jan. 
14, 2010), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/sites/default/
files/pdf/genre.pdf (Gen Re NPA). 
 357. See generally ANDREW KILPATRICK, WARREN BUFFETT: THE GOOD GUY OF WALL 
STREET (1995). 
 358. This is evident from reading selections from Buffett’s annual letters to Berkshire 
Hathaway shareholders during the period from 2000–2006. See WARREN E. BUFFETT & 
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE 
AMERICA 141, 145–47 (2d ed. 2008). 
 359. The issue of charitable contributions has receded, as the DOJ and Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines discourage the practice. But it is worth questioning why. Under the 
analysis in this Article, there is nothing that warrants excluding the topic from consideration in a 
DPA. The DOJ and Organizational Sentencing Guidelines discouragement may be unwarranted 
reaction to critical objections that miss the mark.  
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involve a corporate commitment to contribute funds to designated 
organizations. Some critics object to such commitments because, on 
their face, they are remote from any agency costs of internal corporate 
policing. Other critics see prosecutorial overreaching when the 
prosecutor personally favors the charity receiving the required donation. 
It is obviously indefensible for a prosecutor to propose terms designed 
to advance personal interests.360 Such donations may be consistent with 
the existing corporate governance or have another defensible purpose, 
but it is up to the prosecutor to provide reasoning and quiet the critics.  
Critics often cite the Bristol-Myers Squibb deal as an example of a 
required donation amounting to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. 
They single out the requirement that the company endow a chair in legal 
ethics at Seton Hall University Law School, from which the prosecuting 
attorney graduated.361 But the prosecutors report that the requirement 
was made in general terms to promote ethical training of company 
executives and the only restriction was geographic—that it be done in 
New Jersey, the location of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s headquarters.362 The 
other law schools in New Jersey already had a program. Management 
chose Seton Hall after the DPA was finished.363 This explanation 
negates the charge of parochialism and adds a compliance-oriented 
rationale of providing related training to company personnel.364 
An important factor to consider about charitable donations is the 
relationship between a company’s existing governance philosophy 
concerning charitable giving and the donation. Some companies have a 
tradition of corporate charitable giving, while others do not. Those 
traditions should inform judgments about such terms in DPAs. For 
example, AIG and Berkshire Hathaway historically foreswore using 
corporate resources for charitable purposes, both stressing the boards’ 
belief that such allocations were the prerogative of shareholders.365 But 
                                                                                                                     
 360. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 285, at 856–58.  
 361. E.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1384–85 (2009); Arlen & Kahan, supra note 107, at 15 n.56; 
Spivack & Raman, supra note 97, at 174 & n.83 (characterizing the textual presentation of the 
term as objectionable along with a footnote citing other sources explaining its possible 
legitimacy).  
 362. See Christie & Hanna, supra note 7, at 1058 n.29. 
 363. Id. 
 364. A more prudent approach would be for the prosecutor to forbid targets from naming 
given institutions with which the prosecutor’s office is associated. See supra note 351. 
 365. See GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 157–58 (AIG); BUFFETT & 
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 358, at 62 (Berkshire Hathaway). Many AIG directors made 
charitable giving by endowing private foundations dedicated to their preferred causes. Neil Starr 
had begun that practice, endowing a foundation of modest size that, concentrated in AIG stock, 
would grow over three decades after his death to several billion dollars. Other directors, 
including Buck Freeman, Hank Greenberg, Jimmy Manton, and Ernie Stempel, followed suit by 
establishing private foundations to make charitable gifts, which aggregated to billions of dollars. 
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other corporations, including Bristol-Myers Squibb, follow a different 
philosophy and routinely make such contributions. Corporate charitable 
giving at Bristol-Myers Squibb included an entire category devoted to 
professorships and related academic positions.366 While the DPA was 
consistent with past practice and thus appropriate as a matter of 
corporate governance at Bristol-Myers Squibb,367 at AIG or Berkshire 
Hathaway such a term would have been inconsistent with their 
particular practices and therefore inappropriate. 
Prosecutors should be able to demonstrate at least some logical link 
between the company, its alleged wrongdoing, and the related charitable 
cause. A doubtful example appeared in the DPA with Operations 
Management International.368 Prosecutors alleged that it violated 
environmental laws.369 The DPA called for Operations Management to 
donate to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy Alumni Association to endow 
a chair in environmental studies.370 Without an explanation, there is no 
obvious logical connection between the alleged violations and the 
particular company or between the alleged violations and the 
prospective improvement.  
A similar opacity problem afflicted the DPA with Gibson Guitar 
Corp. It allegedly violated the Lacey Act and foreign laws restricting 
the use of certain wood.371 Gibson allegedly acquired certain protected 
wood unlawfully for manufacturing the fingerboards of its guitars.372 In 
addition to a fine and compliance commitments, the DPA required 
Gibson to donate $50,000 to the National Fish and Wildlife 
Federation.373 Neither the DPA nor accompanying materials explain the 
rationale for that donation. There may be a defensible logic to this, but 
without an explanation critics can easily object to this term.374  
                                                                                                                     
GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 158. At Berkshire, Warren Buffett famously 
contributed virtually his entire net worth to charitable causes. BUFFETT & CUNNINGHAM, supra 
note 358. 
 366. See Grants and Giving, BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, http://www.bms.com/responsibility/
grantsandgiving/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (highlighting Bristol-Myers 
Squibb charitable giving, including “Independent Medical Education” and “Corporate Giving”).  
 367. Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA, supra note 348, at 6. 
 368. Deferred Prosecution Agreement app. A, United States v. Operations Mgmt. Int’l, 
Inc., No. 3:06-cr-00017-EBB (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2006).  
 369. Id. at 1351. 
 370. Id. at app. A. 
 371. Letter from John K. Webb, Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., & Lana N. Pettus, Trial 
Att’y, Environmental Crimes Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Donald A. Carr & William M. 
Sullivan, Jr., Att’ys, Gibson Guitar Corp. 1 (July 27, 2012), available at 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/pdf/Gibson_Guitar.pdf (setting forth 
the terms of the DPA). 
 372.  Id. at 3. 
 373. Id.  
 374. For example, it is possible to classify the Gibson Guitar donation as akin to 
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C.  Monitors and Consultants 
Monitors have theoretical appeal as an oversight mechanism to 
assure compliance with the agreed terms of DPAs.375 Absent some such 
mechanism, violations could go undetected. Yet, there is also room for 
abuse, as when cronyism dominates the selection process and additional 
agency costs plague the monitors.376 Critics cite a series of monitor 
appointments made without any bidding process by the then-U.S. 
Attorney in New Jersey, Christopher Christie, including in the case of 
Bristol-Myers Squibb.377 The DOJ has addressed some of these 
concerns through express guidance on the subject, but the value of using 
monitors remains uncertain.378  
In AIG’s case, a monitor was installed at its FP division in late 2004, 
a few months before Greenberg resigned.379 Initially charged with 
assuring that customers would not use FP products primarily to massage 
their books, the assignment gradually expanded over ensuing years after 
Greenberg left AIG to encompass broader aspects of the FP division’s 
transactions and internal controls.380 The monitor spent 2005, 2006, and 
2007 submitting to the SEC and to management periodic confidential 
reports on a wide range of topics in accounting, compliance, and 
disclosure. AIG paid $20 million for these services.381 The monitor 
apparently did not discover or report to AIG’s board or senior 
                                                                                                                     
community service that judges sometimes impose when sentencing defendants after conviction. 
A prosecutor’s explanation would be better than a professor’s speculation, however.  
 375. See Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate 
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 695 (2009) (arguing that monitors in practice do not “keep[] 
up with the evolution of the compliance profession”); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. 
Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1737 
(2007) (urging “greater specificity in the DPA about the tasks and powers of monitors”). 
 376.  Khanna and Dickinson, supra note 375, at 1736 n.90. 
 377.  See, e.g., Carol Morello & Carol D. Leonnig, Chris Christie’s Long Record of 
Pushing Boundaries, Sparking Controversy, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/chris-christies-long-record-of-pushing-boundaries-spark 
ing-controversy/2014/02/10/50111ed4-8db1-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html. 
 378. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t 
Components & U.S. Att’ys, Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations 2 (Mar. 7, 2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf; Memorandum from 
Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys, 
Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-
Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (May 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidance-monitors.html.  
 379. See supra note 154. 
 380. See GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 126, at 230–31 (recounting the change in 
the FP division after Greenberg’s departure). 
 381. See Peter Lattman, The U.S.’s Fly on the Wall at AIG, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2009, 
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123812186477454361.  
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management the brewing problems at the FP division that contributed to 
the financial crisis of 2008.382 Monitors can be ineffective, despite being 
costly.383 
Such failures, along with aversion to accusations of cronyism, may 
explain why the use of monitors in DPAs has declined lately. For 
instance, in the mid-2000s, almost all DPAs required a monitor whereas 
in recent years only about one-third did.384 Other alternatives may avoid 
such pitfalls and be more effective for given companies. An exquisite 
example appears in the DPA with Gen Re. The requirement385 that a 
Berkshire official attend all Gen Re audit committee meetings installed 
a functional monitor employed by the parent company, providing 
reliable oversight in a logical governance fit. 
Many DPAs require a company to hire a consultant charged with 
recommending governance changes. Terms often require the company 
to accept the directives except on the approval of the governmental 
authority. Potential changes may be extremely broad and include any 
number of provisions addressing every aspect of compliance and all 
parts of corporate governance. The AIG DPA had such a clause, which 
required AIG to retain a consultant and accept all changes.386 That 
appears to be an enormous vesting of discretion in a person whose 
authority would be final and unreviewable by any third party. This is 
objectionable on prudential grounds. The call for prosecutorial 
investigation ex ante and articulation ex post should contribute a sense 
of competence to enable prosecutors to curtail that discretion either by 
accelerating the reporting and recommendation phase or by actively 
supervising any consultant that may remain necessary.  
D.  Shareholders and Disclosure 
Another objection to including governance terms in DPAs is that 
shareholders should have input when DPAs—as they sometimes do—
contain terms that significantly impact shareholders. In accordance with 
state corporation law, some of these terms require shareholder approval. 
                                                                                                                     
 382. See Memorandum from Mark Jickling, Specialist in Fin. Econ., Cong. Research Serv., 
to the House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Independent Consultant Reports on AIG 
Accounting Reforms (May 5, 2009); see also SEC v. AIG, 854 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 2012), 
available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/cc/KesslerFOI_opinion.pdf (granting motion to compel 
disclosure of the reports by journalist Sue Reisinger of Corporate Counsel), rev’d 712 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2013).  
 383. See Lisa K. Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: 
USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 110, 121–22 (Anthony S. Barkow & 
Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (criticizing the monitor in the AIG case). 
 384. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 107, at 40 (stating the percentages at 84% from 2003–05 
versus less than 35% from 2008–2010).  
 385. See supra text accompanying notes 356–358. 
 386. See supra text accompanying notes 206–211. 
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One way to address this valid concern is to allow shareholders to vote 
for inclusion of certain terms in DPAs.387 This would draw on the usual 
rules of corporate law for use in the realm of criminal justice 
administration. 
 State corporation law usually vests shareholders with voting power 
over charter amendments that might define certain board attributes such 
as size and director election rules.388 It may be desirable in some cases 
to consider shareholder votes on other matters typically within a board’s 
discretion, such as committee types, meetings, and attendees; or 
management, such as reporting lines. A small number of topics might 
even require a shareholder vote under federal law, such as the approval 
of a company’s outside auditors.  
Shareholder voting would both empower shareholders—recognizing 
the role in corporate governance that their economic interest affords—
and reveal information relevant to prosecutorial decision-making on 
how to proceed. Giving shareholders such a voice mutes criticism of 
unilateral prosecutorial or managerial action. It also enhances the 
integrity of the process and increases the capacity of observers to 
evaluate the legitimacy of its procedures and the results.  
DPAs invariably require a corporate target to provide public 
disclosure of various kinds.389 These disclosures routinely include the 
circumstances leading to the DPA and related allegations. Other DPAs 
call for maintaining enhanced standards relating to disclosure in the 
interest of increasing the corporation’s transparency. Disclosure is an 
integral part of corporate governance and can also promote compliance.  
Critics have not challenged the inclusion of disclosure terms in 
DPAs. It would be difficult to sustain such a critique when the 
disclosure concerns management’s discussion and analysis of such 
matters as ongoing business operations and the circumstances leading to 
the DPA. As a matter of corporate governance, however, some restraint 
is advisable to assure that a DPA’s disclosure requirements gel with 
existing corporate practices concerning disclosure, such as the form and 
timing of communications to shareholders. Within the framework of 
securities and corporate disclosure law, companies adopt varying 
stances on the detail of and frequency with which information is 
supplied to shareholders, and scholars debate the optimal level of 
disclosure.390  
                                                                                                                     
 387. See Baer, supra note 251, at 2. 
 388.  E.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-626 of 2013 
Reg. Sess.). 
 389. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 417–18 (2003). 
 390. See, e.g., id. at 417. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prosecutors targeting corporate defendants may give insufficient 
consideration to corporate governance when exercising discretion over 
how to proceed. Yet, corporate governance factors are vital to both the 
process pursued and settlements reached. Prosecutors should therefore 
consider such variables as shareholder demographics, board orientation, 
executive reporting, employee incentives, and other factors that bear on 
how any given formal corporate governance structure operates. 
Prosecutors who heed governance at the outset both earn credibility to 
include governance terms in resolutions and are likelier to propose more 
effective, narrowly tailored terms. Failure to investigate first can have 
devastating consequences, as the Arthur Andersen and AIG cases 
suggest. Investigation and articulation would produce clear benefits, 
including increased legitimacy of DPAs ex post, neutralizing criticism 
aimed at many DPAs. 
The DOJ should update its guidelines to encourage prosecutors to 
consider governance at the outset and to provide such explanations. 
Other prosecutorial leaders nationwide should follow suit. To be sure, 
this prescription would not necessarily guarantee better outcomes. For 
example, had prosecutors taken heed at AIG and viewed the governance 
realities starkly, they may have determined that a radical overhaul was 
necessary and still imposed all the same changes. Nevertheless, 
consideration would increase the chance of desirable outcomes. This 
problem reflects the challenge of working within a framework of 
discretion. There will always be some risk of error. While not 
guaranteed, this integrated approach is better than the status quo. After 
all, had prosecutors studied Andersen in the prescribed way, a better 
outcome would likely have resulted. 
In short: this Article recognizes the proliferation of DPAs as a novel 
form of corporate criminal justice administration that would benefit 
from being formalized, systematized, and catalogued, rather than 
maintained in the black box of traditional prosecutorial discretion. 
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A. Bristol-Myers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
B. Prosecutors’ Articulations on Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA 
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A. Bristol-Myers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
 
The following are excerpts from the DPA dated June 15, 2005, 
between Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”) and the U.S. Department of 
Justice, District of New Jersey (referred to as the “Office”). The DPA 
arose out of alleged accounting violations concerning the timing, 
measurement, and disclosure of transactions that had the effect of 
premature recognition of revenue. Appendix B excerpts prosecutorial 
explanations that address most of the following directly. 
 
5. BMS has undertaken extensive reforms and remedial actions in 
response to the conduct at BMS that is and has been the subject of the 
investigation by the Office. These reforms and remedial actions have 
included:  
  (a) Retaining the Honorable Frederick B. Lacey as Independent 
Advisor, to conduct a comprehensive review of the implementation and 
effectiveness of the internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure, 
planning, budget and projection processes and related compliance 
functions of the Company, as well as to serve additional supervisory 
and monitoring functions described herein; . . .  
  (d) Making significant personnel changes . . . after the Office 
commenced its investigation including: (i) replacing the former Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO); (ii) replacing the former President of the 
Worldwide Medicines Group; (iii) replacing the former Controller; 
(iv) establishing the position of Assistant Controller for Financial 
Compliance and Control; (v) establishing the position of Chief 
Compliance Officer; (vi) establishing a position for an experienced 
securities regulation and disclosure lawyer who has a significant role in 
all BMS disclosure responsibilities;  
  (e) Changing its budget process, to assure that appropriate 
consideration is given to input and analysis from the bottom to top, and 
not exclusively from top to bottom, and adequately documenting that 
process;  
  (f) Forming a business risk and disclosure group that includes 
senior management, the Independent Advisor and counsel to the 
Independent Advisor;  
  (g) Identifying and implementing actions to improve the 
effectiveness of its disclosure controls and procedures and internal 
controls, including enhancing its resources and training with respect to 
financial reporting and disclosure responsibilities, and reviewing such 
actions with its Audit Committee and independent auditors;  
(h) Implementing a formal review and certification process of its 
annual and quarterly reports filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC); and  
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  (i) Providing an effective mechanism in the form of a 
confidential hotline and e-mail address, of which BMS employees are 
informed and can use to notify BMS of any concerns about wholesaler 
inventory levels or the integrity of the financial disclosures, books and 
records of BMS. . . . 
 8. BMS shall establish the position of non-executive Chairman of 
the BMS Board of Directors (the “Non-Executive Chairman”), to 
advance and underscore the Company’s commitment to exemplary 
corporate citizenship, to best practices of effective corporate governance 
and the highest principles of integrity and professionalism, and to 
fostering a culture of openness, accountability and compliance 
throughout the Company. BMS shall retain the position of Non-
Executive Chairman at least throughout the term of this Agreement.  
 9. BMS agrees to appoint an additional non-executive Director 
acceptable to the Office to the BMS Board of Directors within sixty 
(60) days of the execution of this Agreement.  
 10. The Company’s CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance 
Officer regularly shall brief and provide information to the Non-
Executive Chairman, in a manner to be determined by the Non-
Executive Chairman. In addition, the Non-Executive Chairman shall 
have the authority to meet with, and require reports on any subject from, 
any officer or employee of the Company.  
11. BMS agrees that until at least the date of the filing of the 
Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended 2006, it will retain an 
outside, independent individual or entity (the “Monitor”), selected by 
BMS and approved by the Office. BMS may employ as the Monitor the 
Honorable Frederick B. Lacey. It shall be a condition of the Monitor’s 
retention that the Monitor is independent of BMS and that no attorney-
client relationship shall be formed between the Monitor and BMS.  
12. The Monitor shall: (a) Monitor BMS’s compliance with this 
Agreement, and have authority to require BMS to take any steps he 
believes are necessary to comply with the terms of this Agreement; 
(b) Continue the review, reforms and other functions undertaken as the 
Independent Advisor; (c) Report to the Office, on at least a quarterly 
basis and between thirty and forty-five calendar days after the filing of 
the Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended 2006, as to BMS’s 
compliance with this Agreement and the implementation and 
effectiveness of the internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure 
processes and related compliance functions of the 
Company. . . . (d) Cooperate with the SEC and provide information 
about BMS as requested by that agency; (e) Monitor BMS’s compliance 
with applicable federal securities laws, and in his quarterly reports make 
recommendations necessary to ensure that the Company complies with 
applicable federal securities laws; . . .  
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13. BMS agrees that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Non-
Executive Chairman, and General Counsel will meet quarterly with the 
Office and the Monitor, in conjunction with the Monitor’s quarterly 
reports.  
14. BMS shall adopt all recommendations contained in each report 
submitted by the Monitor to the Office unless BMS objects to the 
recommendation and the Office agrees that adoption of the 
recommendation should not be required. The Monitor’s reports to the 
Office shall not be received or reviewed by BMS prior to submission to 
the Office; such reports will be preliminary until senior management of 
BMS is given the opportunity, within ten (10) days after the submission 
of the report to the Office, to comment to the Monitor and the Office in 
writing upon such reports, and the Monitor has reviewed and provided 
to the Office responses to such comments, upon which such reports 
shall be considered final. . . . 
17. The Non-Executive Chairman and the Compensation Committee 
of the Board of Directors shall set goals and objectives relevant to 
compensation of the CEO, evaluate the CEO’s performance in light of 
those goals and objectives, and recommend to the Board of Directors 
compensation based on this evaluation.  
18. BMS agrees that it will establish and maintain a training and 
education program, which shall be reviewed and approved by the Board 
of Directors, designed to advance and underscore the Company’s 
commitment to exemplary corporate citizenship, to best practices of 
effective corporate governance and the highest principles of integrity 
and professionalism, and to fostering a culture of openness, 
accountability and compliance throughout the Company. . . . The Board 
of Directors shall communicate to the Mandatory Participants, in 
writing or by video, its review and endorsement of the training and 
education program. . . . 
20. BMS shall endow a chair at Seton Hall University School of Law 
dedicated to the teaching of business ethics and corporate governance, 
which position shall include conducting one or more seminars per year 
on business ethics and corporate governance at Seton Hall University 
School of Law that members of BMS’s executive and management 
staff, along with representatives of the executive and management staffs 
of other companies in the New Jersey area, may attend. . . . 
22. Within thirty (30) days of the execution of this Agreement, BMS 
agrees to call a meeting, on a date mutually agreed upon by BMS and 
the Office, of its senior executives and any senior financial personnel, 
and any other BMS employees who the Company desires to attend, such 
meeting to be attended by the United States Attorney and other 
representatives of the Office for the purpose of communicating the 
goals and expected effect of this Agreement. 
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23. For a period of one year from the execution of this Agreement, 
the Non-Executive Chairman, CEO, and General Counsel shall 
contemporaneously monitor either in person or telephonically BMS’s 
quarterly conference calls for analysts (“analyst calls”), and the Non-
Executive Chairman shall attend and participate in any preparatory 
meetings held among the CEO, the CFO, the General Counsel and other 
members of BMS senior management in anticipation of the analyst 
calls. The General Counsel shall ensure that representatives of the BMS 
legal division are informed and consulted regarding, at a minimum, 
issues relating to disclosure or securities law that may arise in the 
course of preparing for the analyst calls.  
24. The CEO and CFO shall prepare and submit to the Non-
Executive Chairman, Chief Compliance Officer and the Monitor 
described in paragraph 11 written reports on the following subjects: 
(a) all non-standard transactions with major U.S. wholesalers, such 
written report to be submitted within fifteen (15) days of such 
transaction; (b) an overview and analysis of BMS’s annual budget 
process for its major business units, including description of significant 
instances of any top-down changes to business unit submissions, such 
written report to be submitted together with the proposed budget 
submitted for approval to the Board of Directors; (c) sales and earnings 
forecasts or projections at the corporate or major business unit level 
which indicate a quarterly target will not be met, together with a 
description of steps subsequently taken, if any, to achieve the budget 
target, such written report to be submitted quarterly and at least ten (10) 
business days prior to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call; 
(d) description of significant instances in which the preliminary 
quarterly closing of the books of any major business unit indicated that 
the business unit would not meet its budget target for any sales or 
earnings measure.  
25. BMS agrees that it shall include in its quarterly and annual 
public filings with the SEC and its annual report to shareholders 
financial disclosures concerning the following: (a)(i) for the Company’s 
U.S. Pharmaceuticals business, estimated wholesaler/direct-customer 
inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) products sold by such business 
and (ii) for major non-U.S. countries, estimated aggregate 
wholesaler/direct-customer inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) 
pharmaceutical products sold in such countries taken as a whole 
measured by aggregate annual sales in such countries; (b) arrangements 
with and policies concerning wholesalers/direct customers and other 
distributors of such products, including but not limited to efforts by 
BMS to control and monitor wholesaler/distributor inventory levels; 
(c) data concerning prescriptions or other measures of end-user demand 
for such top fifteen (15) BMS pharmaceutical products sold within the 
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U.S. and in major non-U.S. countries; (d) acquisition, divestiture, and 
restructuring reserve policies and activity; and (e) rebate accrual 
policies and activity. The CEO shall, at the annual BMS shareholder 
meeting, report to the shareholders on these topics.  
26. BMS agrees that it will continue to review and improve, where 
necessary, the content of its public financial and non-financial public 
disclosures, including periodic SEC filings, annual and other 
shareholder reports, press releases, and disclosures during analyst 
conference calls, as well as during meetings with investors and credit 
ratings agencies. BMS agrees that it will at all times strive for openness 
and transparency in its public reporting and disclosures.  
27. BMS shall encourage the free flow of information between its 
employees and its external auditor, and encourage its CFO and senior 
finance personnel to seek advice from the external auditor. The CEO, 
CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer shall meet 
quarterly with the Company’s external auditors, such meeting to occur 
following the closing of the Company’s books for the quarter and prior 
to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call. At the quarterly 
meeting, the BMS attendees shall discuss business and financial 
reporting developments, issues and trends with the external auditor, as 
well as provide information to the external auditor concerning the 
subjects described in paragraph 24 above, and shall respond to inquiries 
from the external auditor.  
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B.  Prosecutors’ Articulations on Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA 
 
The following are excerpts from the law review article, published in 
2006, by prosecutors in the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”). The 
article explains some of the governance terms of the DPA excerpted in 
Appendix A.391 Far from perfect and perhaps not even optimal, it 
illustrates the relative ease of the exercise and suggests the potential 
value of articulations that, together, furnish considerable systemic 
benefits. The article also explains some of the background of the 
investigation, including highlights of the company’s governance profile 
reflecting a degree of ex ante consideration of important factors. 
 
One issue we faced was how to reverse Bristol-Myers’ failures to 
disclose facts underlying its channel stuffing, accruals for rebates, and 
manipulation of reserves. The deferred prosecution agreement deals 
with the most obvious aspect of this problem by mandating specific 
disclosures in Bristol-Myers’ public filings with the SEC and its annual 
report to shareholders [quoting ¶ 25 as follows]: 
Bristol-Myers agrees that it shall include in its quarterly and annual 
public filings with the SEC and its annual report to shareholders 
financial disclosures concerning the following: (a)(i) for the Company’s 
U.S. Pharmaceuticals business, estimated wholesaler/direct-customer 
inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) products sold by such business 
and (ii) for major non-U.S. countries, estimated aggregate 
wholesaler/direct-customer inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) 
pharmaceutical products sold in such countries taken as a whole 
measured by aggregate annual sales in such countries; (b) arrangements 
with and policies concerning wholesalers/direct customers and other 
distributors of such products, including but not limited to efforts by 
Bristol-Myers to control and monitor wholesaler/distributor inventory 
levels; (c) data concerning prescriptions or other measures of end-user 
demand for such top fifteen (15) Bristol-Myers pharmaceutical products 
sold within the U.S. and in major non-U.S. countries; (d) acquisition, 
divestiture, and restructuring reserve policies and activity; and (e) rebate 
accrual policies and activity. The CEO shall, at the annual Bristol-
Myers shareholder meeting, report to the shareholders on these topics. 
Requiring specific disclosures, however, is somewhat akin to 
treating the symptoms of a disease and not its causes. Therefore, we 
sought a more fundamental change in Bristol-Myers’ attitude toward the 
investing public. To that end, the deferred prosecution agreement [in 
¶ 26] includes Bristol-Myers’ commitment “that it will at all times strive 
for openness and transparency in its public reporting and disclosures” 
                                                                                                                     
 391. These selections are from Christie & Hanna, supra note 7, at 1053–58. 
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and “that it will continue to review and improve, where necessary, the 
content of its public financial and non-financial public disclosures, 
including periodic SEC filings, annual and other shareholder reports, 
press releases, and disclosures during analyst conference calls, as well 
as during meetings with investors and credit ratings agencies.”  
The deferred prosecution agreement also calls for Bristol-Myers to 
utilize the expertise of its outside auditors on disclosure and accounting 
matters [quoting ¶ 27 as follows]: 
Bristol-Myers shall encourage the free flow of information between 
its employees and its external auditor, and encourage its CFO and senior 
finance personnel to seek advice from the external auditor. The CEO, 
CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer shall meet 
quarterly with the Company’s external auditors . . . prior to the 
Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call. At the quarterly meeting, 
the Bristol-Myers attendees shall discuss business and financial 
reporting developments, issues and trends with the external auditor, as 
well as provide information to the external auditor concerning the 
subjects described in paragraph 24, and shall respond to inquiries from 
the external auditor.  
By including provisions relating to transparency, our intent was to 
address both specific failings uncovered in the investigation and an 
equally disturbing corporate culture that favored secrecy over openness. 
For example, by requiring regular quarterly meetings among senior 
management and their independent auditors, our expectation is that if 
future law breaking were to occur, it would be much more difficult for 
top management and the auditors to claim ignorance. The goal is that 
Bristol-Myers should report all material facts, good and bad, to the 
investing public. With respect to unfavorable news, Bristol-Myers must 
get into the habit of disclosure, not concealment; if there is a question 
about whether or not to disclose something, the deferred prosecution 
agreement clearly calls for more information, not less. 
Perhaps the most difficult issue to address in this matter was 
reforming Bristol-Myers’ corporate governance in ways that would give 
some assurance that the failures [we found] would not be repeated. At 
the very least, Bristol-Myers’ remaining top management failed to 
detect and prevent the wrongdoing [we found]. Yet federal prosecutors 
must tread warily in the area of corporate governance. Plainly, federal 
prosecutors have no business telling corporate executives what business 
judgments to make or otherwise intruding into business decisions. It 
was clear to us, however, that Bristol-Myers’ board of directors and top 
executives had to be more involved in governing the company and 
therefore more accountable to all its stakeholders. This greater 
involvement of top management, together with a healthy dose of outside 
oversight, would provide confidence that Bristol-Myers will not repeat 
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past sins. 
Bristol-Myers, like many U.S. companies, had historically allowed 
its top leader to hold both positions of chairman of the board of 
directors and chief executive officer (CEO). This structure undoubtedly 
has its own benefits and risks: a strong chair/CEO is quite likely a more 
efficient structure than splitting those jobs, yet it provides fewer checks 
and balances. We determined there were three options to deal with the 
failure of the CEO and the board of directors to address the wrongdoing 
that occurred on their watch. The first was to leave the governance 
structure intact and hope the other provisions of the deferred 
prosecution agreement (along with the presence of the federal monitor) 
would solve the problem. The second alternative was to demand the 
resignation of the chairman and CEO for failure to discover and address 
the wrongdoing. The third was a hybrid of the first two options, which 
was formulated during negotiations with corporate counsel. The 
reasoning behind this provision was two-fold: to have an active, 
experienced non-executive chairman act as an effective check on the 
CEO; and to insure that the CEO’s office would not act as a bottleneck 
for information between the corporate officers and the board of 
directors. We believed this change would enhance the openness and 
effectiveness of the governance of Bristol-Myers. Eventually, 
management agreed with our assessment. 
The Bristol-Myers deferred prosecution agreement requires the 
company to split the roles of board chair and chief executive [quoting 
¶ 8]: 
Bristol-Myers shall establish the position of non-executive Chairman 
of the Bristol-Myers Board of Directors (the “Non-Executive 
Chairman”), to advance and underscore the Company’s commitment to 
exemplary corporate citizenship, to best practices of effective corporate 
governance and the highest principles of integrity and professionalism, 
and to fostering a culture of openness, accountability and compliance 
throughout the Company. Bristol-Myers shall retain the position of 
Non-Executive Chairman at least throughout the term of this 
Agreement.  
This approach, we feel, provides maximum board involvement in 
and accountability for Bristol-Myers’ business decisions, including its 
public disclosures. The deferred prosecution agreement deliberately 
avoids any temptation to micro-manage the role of the non-executive 
chairman. Instead, it sets forth aspirational goals for the company and 
mandates information sharing with the non-executive chairman. [The 
article here quotes ¶ 10.] It also gives the non-executive chairman a 
limited role in preparing for and monitoring quarterly conference calls 
with Wall Street analysts and investors. [The article here quotes ¶ 23.] 
The Board selected James D. Robinson III, a long-time Bristol-Myers 
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Director, to fill this role. 
In addition to splitting the roles of board chair and chief executive, 
the deferred prosecution agreement also requires Bristol-Myers to 
appoint an additional non-executive Director acceptable to the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office. Our aim was to bring fresh blood and a new 
perspective to the board of directors; our preference for someone with a 
law enforcement background was made clear. Accordingly, Bristol-
Myers selected, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office approved, Louis J. 
Freeh, a former federal judge, federal prosecutor, and Director of the 
FBI, as the additional director. 
Our conclusions regarding these governance issues were informed 
by meetings with both the CEO and the entire board of directors. The 
U.S. Attorney, along with the other prosecutors on the investigation, 
met a number of times with the CEO. One of the purposes of these 
meetings was to gain insight into the way management actually worked 
at Bristol-Myers. That knowledge helped us to intelligently and 
comprehensively negotiate a deferred prosecution agreement that dealt 
with the real problems at Bristol-Myers. The CEO gave us a real 
insider’s view of how these events unfolded from his perspective. 
We questioned the CEO regarding his relationship with his other 
senior officers, the board of directors, and his external auditors. We 
were attempting to find out every detail we could as to why the 
governance structures at Bristol-Myers had failed. By the very nature of 
the questions, these conversations were at times contentious. We 
discovered, however, that one of the root causes of the failures was the 
lack of timely and relevant information reaching all the decision makers 
at the top of the corporate chain of command. This led us to the 
conclusion that alternative information pipelines had to be opened in 
addition to the pipeline into the CEO’s office. This further reinforced 
our conviction that the splitting of the chairman and CEO positions was 
a good idea. 
Once we decided that the separation of the chairman and CEO’s 
position was advisable, we felt that a meeting with the entire board of 
directors was necessary. We traveled to a regularly scheduled board 
meeting in Wilmington, Delaware and engaged in a ninety-minute open 
exchange with the Board. It was an opportunity to discuss previous 
conduct, and our ideas for future remediation, with the board. The 
Board shared with us their concerns about a deferred prosecution 
agreement and the potential effect on their business plans. Most 
importantly, we were able to gauge the commitment of the Board to real 
change in governance. The meeting also gave us the chance to assess 
each board member in light of our desire to potentially find a non-
executive chairman who had a deep knowledge of Bristol-Myers and a 
real desire to be an agent of change of the corporate culture, which 
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created these issues in the first place. 
These corporate governance changes, along with the other 
governance measures Bristol-Myers adopted prior to the deferred 
prosecution agreement are no guarantee of perfectly smooth sailing 
during the term of the agreement. Regardless, this increased internal 
accountability should go a long way toward achieving the goal of good 
corporate citizenship. We believed, however, that more was needed 
from outsiders to insure compliance with the agreement and a change in 
corporate culture. 
The maxim “trust but verify” applies in deferred prosecution 
agreements. From the prosecutor’s point of view, it would be highly 
irresponsible to allow a corporation whose prosecution is being deferred 
to go unsupervised during the deferral period. Bristol-Myers, to its 
credit, recognized at the inception of the investigation, and long before 
we began to negotiate the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement, 
that outside help would benefit the company. The company retained as 
an independent advisor the Honorable Frederick B. Lacey, a former 
U.S. Attorney and federal judge in the District of New Jersey, and gave 
him a broad mandate to review the company’s internal controls, 
financial reporting, disclosure, compliance, and budget processes. We 
requested, and Bristol-Myers agreed, to expand Judge Lacey’s role to 
become the independent federal monitor at Bristol-Myers. 
The independent monitor has wide authority to oversee Bristol-
Myer’s compliance with the deferred prosecution agreement and 
strengthen its ongoing remediation efforts. [The DPA at ¶ 12] charges 
the monitor to perform the following tasks, among others:  
(a) Monitor Bristol-Myers’ compliance with this Agreement, and 
have authority to require Bristol-Myers to take any steps he believes are 
necessary to comply with the terms of this Agreement; (b) Continue the 
review, reforms and other functions undertaken as the Independent 
Advisor; (c) Report to the Office, on at least a quarterly basis . . . as to 
Bristol-Myers’ compliance with this Agreement and the implementation 
and effectiveness of the internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure 
processes and related compliance functions of the Company; 
(d) Monitor Bristol-Myers’ compliance with applicable federal 
securities laws, and in his quarterly reports make recommendations 
necessary to ensure that the Company complies with applicable federal 
securities laws. 
The monitor’s power is also significantly bolstered by his authority 
to make recommendations that Bristol-Myers must adopt “unless 
Bristol-Myers objects to the recommendation and the Office agrees that 
adoption of the recommendation should not be required.” A strong, 
independent monitor is in a far better position to ride herd over a 
mammoth corporation than any U.S. Attorney’s Office or Probation 
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Office. Independent monitors are visible, on-site reminders that 
compliance with the terms of a deferred prosecution agreement is 
mandatory, not optional. Monitors are able to observe and understand 
the business they oversee, along with its personnel and processes, in 
ways that federal prosecutors never could or should. If the company 
views their monitor as a force for positive change and not as an 
unwanted burden, all sides benefit. 
The central role of Judge Lacey in ensuring successful adherence to 
the spirit and letter of the deferred prosecution agreement by no means 
ends the role of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in this matter. The agreement 
makes it clear that all participants—Bristol-Myers, the independent 
monitor, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office—should treat the agreement as 
an opportunity to work together toward the common aim of making 
Bristol-Myers a model corporate citizen. The agreement provides for 
regular communication among the parties, requiring Bristol-Myers’ 
CEO, non-executive chairman, and general counsel to meet quarterly 
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the monitor. [¶ 13] The quarterly 
meetings are an opportunity to discuss the monitor’s quarterly reports 
and any other issues and concerns that may arise, to keep the lines of 
communication open, and to remind all of the importance of compliance 
with the agreement and the serious consequences breach of the 
agreement would have for the company, its shareholders, and 
employees. 
The regular quarterly meetings have already proven to be useful and 
interesting. Prior to each meeting, we are provided with a 400–500 page 
quarterly progress report by the independent monitor. The report 
provides updates on Bristol-Myers’ business operations, new legal 
issues arising in any of its operating entities, compliance with the 
deferred prosecution agreement, and a forward-looking section on 
issues Bristol-Myers will confront in the next quarter. We also exchange 
draft agendas prior to meeting so that all topics of interest to both 
parties are addressed. The attendees at the meeting include the non-
executive chairman, the chief executive officer, the general counsel, the 
U.S. Attorney, his counsel, and the Assistant U.S. Attorneys who 
prosecuted the matter. The independent monitor presides at the meeting. 
To further emphasize the post-deferred prosecution agreement sense of 
partnership between the parties, the site of the meeting is alternated 
between our offices and [those of] Bristol-Myers. . . . 
In addition, to impress upon Bristol-Myers’ top managers and 
finance personnel the seriousness of the company’s situation, the 
deferred prosecution agreement also provides [in ¶ 22] for “a 
meeting . . . of its senior executives and any senior financial personnel, 
and any other Bristol-Myers employees who the Company desires to 
attend, such meeting to be attended by the United States Attorney and 
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other representatives of the Office for the purpose of communicating the 
goals and expected effect of this Agreement.” . . . 
The deferred prosecution agreement recognized that Bristol-Myers 
had taken steps to change its budget process, to assure that appropriate 
consideration is given to input and analysis from the bottom to top, and 
not exclusively from top to bottom, and to adequately document that 
process. The agreement requires that Bristol-Myers management keep 
informed about its budget process and the perils of top-down budgeting, 
but does leave budgeting to Bristol-Myers management. [The DPA at 
¶ 24] provides for high-level reporting on issues that will reflect 
whether the old culture of hitting the numbers at all costs still lingers. It 
provides as follows:  
The CEO and CFO shall prepare and submit to the Non-Executive 
Chairman, Chief Compliance Officer and the Monitor described in 
paragraph 11 written reports on the following subjects: (a) all non-
standard transactions with major U.S. wholesalers, such written report 
to be submitted within fifteen (15) days of such transaction; (b) an 
overview and analysis of Bristol-Myers’ annual budget process for its 
major business units, including description of significant instances of 
any top-down changes to business unit submissions, such written report 
to be submitted together with the proposed budget submitted for 
approval to the Board of directors; (c) sales and earnings forecasts or 
projections at the corporate or major business unit level which indicate a 
quarterly target will not be met, together with a description of steps 
subsequently taken, if any, to achieve the budget target, such written 
report to be submitted quarterly and at least ten (10) business days prior 
to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call; (d) description of 
significant instances in which the preliminary quarterly closing of the 
books of any major business unit indicated that the business unit would 
not meet its budget target for any sales or earnings measure. 
The agreement [¶ 18] also requires Bristol-Myers to develop and 
implement a “training and education program, which shall be reviewed 
and approved by the board of directors, designed to advance and 
underscore the Company’s commitment to exemplary corporate 
citizenship, to best practices of effective corporate governance and the 
highest principles of integrity and professionalism, and to fostering a 
culture of openness, accountability and compliance throughout the 
Company.” . . . 
Many of the remedial measures in the deferred prosecution 
agreement—the top-level structural and governance changes, the 
reporting by senior management, and the training and education 
programs for key financial and legal personnel—are designed to spread 
knowledge and responsibility for doing the right thing throughout the 
Bristol-Myers organization. 
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[The following paragraph appeared as footnote 29 in the article, 
addressing ¶ 29 of the DPA.] Another step taken by Bristol-Myers to try 
to change the corporate culture was the endowment of a chair in 
business ethics at Seton Hall University School of Law. The professor 
occupying that endowed chair is required to conduct an annual ethics 
seminar for Bristol-Myers management and other interested industry 
members. The idea for endowing the chair originated with counsel for 
Bristol-Myers. The only requirement from our Office was that the chair 
was endowed at a New Jersey law school. Rutgers University School of 
Law already had a chair in business ethics endowed by Prudential. 
Bristol-Myers, after the signing of the deferred prosecution agreement, 
entered into discussions with the Dean of Seton Hall Law School and 
formally endowed the chair in December 2005. 
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